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 1. Introduction 
1.1 Why Internal Displacement? 
In recent years, internal displacement has emerged as one of the most pressing 
humanitarian, human rights and political issues facing the international community. The 
situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) can be described as falling into a vacuum 
of responsibility within the state. On the one hand, they have often been let down by the 
same national authorities that were supposed to protect them from becoming IDPs in 
the first place. On the other hand, unlike refugees, they do not have an international 
organisation to help them with their plight. The IDPs do not have legal status. The 
principle of state sovereignty limits the ability of the international community to provide 
them with assistance and protection. This has lead to institutional gaps in international 
law when it comes to the protection of IDPs, and constitutes what I will call a protection 
gap.  
In my thesis I will argue that the subject of internal displacement and the protection 
gap are challenging the principle of sovereignty and the work of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). I will analyze how the protection gap 
affects the principle of sovereignty and the UNHCR. The subject of internal 
displacement and the protection gap clearly create both constraints and opportunities for 
the principle of sovereignty and the UNHCR. There are also serious gaps in the United 
Nations (UN) response towards IDPs, and the question is how can the international 
community overcome the obstacles of negative sovereignty and ensure protection to the 
IDPs? Protecting persons forcibly uprooted within their own country by violent 
conflicts, is one of the greatest challenges of our time. I intend to throw a light on the 
IDP situation in a world where their needs continue to be inadequately addressed. 
IDPs have been the focus of particular attention on the part of the international 
community since the beginning of the 1990s. The political aspects of today’s refugee 
problems signal choices that must be made by governments and international 
organizations. Those choices include whether to abide by international obligations or 
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develop new international instruments or agencies; whether to provide ad hoc responses 
to situations; whether to refine national responses to refugee flows, by changing laws 
and procedures or introducing obstacles to arrival; whether to support international 
humanitarian relief; whether to promote solutions, and which ones; and whether to try 
to deal with causes. Each of these political decisions takes place within a context in 
which human rights law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law ought to have 
their impact (Goodwin-Gill 1999:222-223).  
Internal displacement is such an important issue to address is because the scale of 
the IDP problem is immense, and growing. The number of IDPs driven from their 
homes by armed conflict in the world remains at some 25 million people in 50 countries 
affected by conflict (Global IDP Project 2003a), compared to 12 million refugees 
(UNHCR 2002a). In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and an increase in the 
number of internal conflicts, significant demographic changes took place in the two 
groups, with a greater increase in numbers of IDPs than refugees.  
With 25 million IDPs world-wide, this is almost twice as many as refugees. Millions 
more are internally displaced as a result of natural and human-made disasters. Though 
the situation of IDPs has been recognised by the international community, it has not 
been given priority. Unlike refugees, the internally displaced have not left the country 
whose citizens they normally are. As such, they remain entitled to the same rights that all 
other persons in their country enjoy. They do, however, have special needs by virtue of 
their displacement. The challenge the international community is facing today is to 
bridge the gaps that do exist in rights and needs the IDPs may have and strengthen the 
protection of IDPs in armed conflict.  
1.2  What is Internal Displacement –Definition of IDPs 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UNHCR and some  
major non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have developed their own definitions of 
internal displacement, which usually reflects their own operational “peoples of concern”. 
A more inclusive (and still evolving) working definition for IDPs used in this thesis is 
based on the working description of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement: 
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Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or 
obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a 
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised 
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an internationally recognised state border (OCHA 1999:6). 
 
Given the broad scope of the description, this thesis chooses to focus only on those 
internally displaced who have been forced to flee from “armed conflict, situations of 
generalised violence, and violations of human rights”. Those who have been internally displaced 
as a result of natural or human-made disasters or, who are economic migrants are not 
considered in this thesis. 
1.3 Regional Distribution 
The largest displacement situations are found in Africa. Two of the countries which 
have the highest number are Angola and Sudan which each have 4 million internally 
displaced. In the Americas, Colombia is the worst hit with more than 2 million displaced, 
while Indonesia tops the list in Asia with 1.2 million IDPs. Iraq, currently with 700,000 
IDPs, which may yet increase up to one million as a result of military intervention in 
March 2003, is the most severely affected country in the Middle East. In Europe, the 
scope of displacement varies considerably from one country to another where Moldova 
has the smallest IDP population with 1,000 persons, while Turkey has an estimated 1 
million IDPs (Global IDP Project 2003b).  
There are vested interests in withholding or exaggerating facts and figures related to 
IDPs (Hampton 1998:xv). But statistics are necessary to appreciate the size of the 
problem; but they are, at best, estimates and, at worst, misleading. Even if those 
receiving some form of international or national assistance are counted, those who never 
receive such assistance and who are far from the cameras and notebooks of the 
international media may never be counted (Vincent 2001a:2). 
1.4 Factors Contributing to Internal Displacement 
According to March Vincent (2001a:2), there are two principle reasons contributing 
to the apparent increase in internal displacement, which also constitute the basis for why 
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choosing to focus on the principle of sovereignty and the UNHCR. Firstly, there has 
been a change in the nature of conflict and a rise in communal violence since the end of 
the Cold War. Almost all of today’s armed conflicts are internal. Traditionally, war was 
fought between states and 90% of the victims were soldiers. Today, most of the victims 
are civilians –children, women and men, minorities, refugees, IDPs and the elderly 
(Robinson 1999:11). Increasingly, civilian displacement has become a military or political 
objective of communal violence. The ICRC, which normally follows a discrete path in 
advocacy, has for several years publicly deplored the use of civilians as intentional 
targets. The changing nature of conflict has had an effect on the traditional concept of 
sovereignty (Vincent 2001a:2). 
Secondly, the world has witnessed the declining willingness, -on the part of some 
states-, to accept large refugee inflows. That attitude effectively denies the right to 
asylum and limits the ability of IDPs to escape national boundaries (UNHCR 1997). 
European governments are frequently singled out for their restrictive policies towards 
asylum-seekers; but those kinds of policies are now cropping up all over the world 
(Vincent 2001a:2). As a result, people are being trapped in civil conflict areas. It is ironic 
that the fastest growing group in need for protection, IDPs, is the group with no 
international institutional legal framework to give them protection. The declining 
willingness to accept refugees also affects the work of UNHCR. 
1.5 Addressing the Crisis 
In recent years there has been growing awareness within the international 
community of the enormity of the crisis of internal displacement and the need to take 
adequate steps to address it. But today the international response system is still largely ad 
hoc. UN efforts to improve capacity and response to internal displacement really started 
in 1992 when, at the request of the United Nations’ Commission on Human Rights, the 
UN Secretary-General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Gali, appointed a representative, 
Francis Deng, to raise awareness of the problem and to investigate ways to improve 
protection and response. Deng observed that, unlike the case of refugees, there was no 
single organisation within the UN system responsible for protecting and assisting the 
internally displaced (E/CN.4/1993/35). In 1996, he concluded: 
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Because there is no one organisation, or collection of organisations, mandated to take 
responsibility for the internally displaced, there are institutional gaps in the international 
system. At the same time, there is no political will to create a new organisation 
mandated to protect and assist these persons. Nor is it likely that an existing institution 
will be mandated to assume full responsibility for the internally displaced. The residual 
option is that of a collaborative arrangement among a wide variety of bodies and 
organisations whose mandates and activities are relevant to the problems of internal 
displacement (E/CN.4/1996/52: paragraph 16) 
 
We can draw the same conclusion today as in 1996, there is still no agency or 
organisation whose specific mandate it is to protect IDPs. What we have is a 
collaborative approach, centred on the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 
created in 1991. The IASC is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and is 
composed of the heads of major humanitarian and development organisations, including 
UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement, The World Bank and the International 
Organisation for Migration, plus three NGO umbrella groups. The IASC’s role is to 
strengthen coordination in emergency situations (Vincent 2001a:3). In 2000, US 
Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, lamented an inadequate and uneven 
protection afforded to internally displaced persons. For him, there was no difference 
between a refugee and an internally displaced person. They are equally victims, but 
treated differently (Goodwin-Gill 2000). Holbrooke demanded a reassessment of the 
institutional structures to deal with the problems of internal displacement: 
It’s unacceptable that legalistic distinction prevent people from receiving the same 
assistance simply because they’re classified as something called IDPs instead of 
refugees…I do not personally believe that shifting responsibility of different agencies to 
head the operation in different areas will work. I believe that “co-heads” means no 
heads and I’m glad that we have an opportunity to keep attention on this enormous 
issue that affects tens of millions of people (Holbrooke 2000). 
In 2001, the IASC created a “Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal 
Displacement”, mandated to assess the humanitarian response at the local level, and 
provide recommendations for improvement. However, the needs of displaced 
populations continued to be inadequately addressed. One reason given for this was the 
unwillingness or inability of governments to address the needs of the displaced. Lack of 
funding was just as much of a problem in the response to IDPs as lack of coordination, 
accountability and expertise. Also, it was serious doubt about the UN commitment to 
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the process, where NGOs were more enthusiastic about improving the UN response to 
internal displacement than the UN itself (Vincent 2001b).  
The international response system is largely ad hoc. The humanitarian, human 
rights, and development organisations that become involved pick and choose the 
situations in which they wish to become engaged on the basis of their mandates and 
resources. Institutional boundaries and limitations contribute to the large number of 
people who do not receive assistance or protection (Cohen and Kunder 2001). 
Insufficient and unpredictable support from the donor community has certainly also had 
a negative impact on the humanitarian response towards IDPs. 
The latest outcome of the international debate on the UN’s responsibility towards 
IDPs is the establishment of a small internal displacement unit within the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in January 2002. Its primary aims are the 
promotion of an improved inter-agency response to the needs of the displaced, and 
support to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) in his role as the coordinator of the 
international humanitarian response to IDPs’ needs. Its impact on the world’s internally 
displaced remains to be seen. The IDP Unit’s role is to primarily be catalytic rather than 
operational, and creating accountability for the protection of IDPs in the field remains 
an important challenge (Weiss 2002).  
1.6 Legal Framework for the Protection of IDPs 
Lack of binding legal framework explicitly addressing the issue of IDP protection,  
similar to the 1951 Refugee Convention, has often been cited in the past as a reason for 
the inadequate response to situations of internal displacement. Existing international law 
provides coverage of the specific needs of the internally displaced. There are nonetheless 
a number of significant gaps and grey areas where protection is insufficient or unclear. 
Closest to a legal framework specifically developed for IDPs are the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement. In 1998, at the request of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly and in cooperation with legal 
experts, Deng’s office developed and issued the “Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement” as a means of drawing international attention to the needs of IDPs and 
to enhance protection for them. Developed by a team of international legal experts, in 
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collaboration with international agencies and NGOs, 30 principles set forth the rights of 
IDPs and the obligation of governments, non-state actors and international 
organisations towards these populations (OCHA 1999:i). The Guiding Principles have 
not been signed or ratified by states and are therefore not considered binding 
international law. However, they restate and reflect other international conventions in 
the fields of Human Rights Law, Humanitarian Law and Refugee Law. Practically almost 
all Principles can be traced to one of these three categories of binding international law 
(Global IDP Project 2002a). However, these laws prove to be insufficient in 
guaranteeing the protection of the internally displaced. By re-stating the existing norms, 
the Guiding Principles address grey areas and gaps regarding protection of IDPs (OCHA 
1999). 
1.7 Thesis 
Internal displacement is a national problem requiring an international response. The 
aim of this thesis is to better understand the problems that impede protection efforts for 
the IDPs and how the protection gap challenges the principle of sovereignty and the 
work of the UNHCR. The principle of sovereignty is one of the obstacles impeding the 
international community from providing protection to IDPs. UNHCR’s mandate is 
based on the principle of non-interference, and with an increase of IDPs and a decrease 
of refugees, the protection gap does affect the work the UNHCR. 
With this as a basis, my thesis will seek to answer the following question:  
 
In which ways do the subject of internal displacement and the protection gap 
challenge the principle of sovereignty and the mandate of the UNHCR? 
 
First, I will address the principle of sovereignty. The increase in internal conflicts 
has caused more IDPs, which has forced analysts to rethink the traditional notion of 
sovereignty. This is because international protection of IDPs needs to be carried out 
within a country, which is in disagreement with the principles of sovereignty, and non-
interference. Any attempt at international involvement can be seen as meddling in the 
domestic affairs of states.  
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Second, I will consider the mandate of the UNHCR. The restrictive asylum policy is 
another reason explaining the increase in numbers of IDPs. The changing asylum policy 
has also resulted in a discussion around the mandate of UNHCR, and whether in-
country protection should be part of this mandate, but which again is in conflict with the 
principle of sovereignty. But when IDPs do not manage to cross an international border 
for a variety of reasons, it is argued that in-country protection by UNHCR is needed to 
access and protect the IDPs. 
Third, I will address the 1951 Refugee Convention of Geneva which provides 
refugees with legal protection. This law is based on the principle of non-interference. 
The UNHCR is responsible for making sure that states abide to the Convention, namely 
protecting people who have crossed an international border. The fact that protection 
and assistance to people fleeing happens more and more within the areas of conflict, has 
made new demands on the international refugee law and some find the Convention 
inadequate as the IDPs have been left out. I will address the question of whether a new 
international legal framework is needed regarding the IDPs.  
In the same chapter, I will provide an overview of approaches set forward by the 
international community trying to fill the protection gap and whether these approaches 
can intercede to overcome the obstacles of negative sovereignty and ensure protection to 
the IDPs.  
Fourth, I will give an empirical illustration of the IDP situation in Colombia. I will 
demonstrate the ways in which the subject of internal displacement challenges the 
principle of sovereignty and the work of the UNHCR in Colombia. Internal 
displacement is a national problem but is requiring the international community’s 
attention.  
1.8 Why the Principle of Sovereignty? 
I have chosen to raise the principal of sovereignty as the national authorities have 
the primary responsibility for addressing the needs of their displaced citizens. However, 
the state often lacks the capacity and sometimes the will to provide them with protection 
and assistance. According to Deng, the international community is called upon not only 
to supplement the efforts of local and national authorities, but also to pay due regard to 
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the efforts of the displaced themselves to cope with, and respond to, their situation 
(Deng 2001:xiii). The principle of sovereignty is what constitutes the political barrier 
when it comes to protecting the IDPs. IDPs are an internal matter, and any attempt to 
create an international agency to address the IDP issue could be seen as implicitly 
meddling in the domestic affairs of states. An important question is whether the 
international community needs the consent of the state when trying to protect the state’s 
IDPs.  
Another reason for why I have chosen the principle of sovereignty as a thematic 
issue is that in recent years the interest of sovereignty has almost exploded. This can 
partly be explained by the end of the Cold War, and possibilities for a “New World 
Order”, where old perceptions about the state’s sovereignty are being questioned. I will 
argue that the subject of internal displacement is part of this New World Order, 
challenging state sovereignty. 
1.9 Why the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)? 
I would like to address the challenges UNHCR meets in dealing with IDPs in a 
changing world. The world has seen an increase in IDPs but the number of refugees has 
decreased. This has given rise to a new refugee agenda. The mandate of the UNHCR 
was developed with the Second World War in mind, and focuses solely on refugees, 
those who have crossed an international border. In the light of a new refugee agenda, I 
attempt to answer which implications this has for the UNHCR. 
The principle of sovereignty and the UNHCR are linked together in the sense that 
UNHCR is based and dependent on a sovereign state’s consent to provide help, and 
legally civilians need to cross an international border, if they are to be entitled to 
UNHCR protection and assistance. 
Furthermore, is it possible for the UN to be a supranational protector, as long as 
states can claim their independence and a sovereign position not subordinated to any 
global supranational authority? In chapter two I discuss the concept of sovereignty as 
responsibility, but what responsibility does the UN have in a situation where the state 
has failed in protecting its IDPs? As there is said to be negative sovereignty, can we also 
talk about “negative UN responsibility”?  
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1.10 Colombia –an Empirical Illustration 
The section on Colombia will be an illustration of how the protection gap manifests 
itself in the real world, and will demonstrate ways in which IDPs challenge the state 
sovereignty and the work of the UNHCR. Colombia’s civil war is one of the world’s 
most vicious protracted crises, an internal conflict often ignored by the worldwide 
audience. Colombia provides us with a representative example in terms both of the 
nature of its internal conflict and large numbers of IDPs, as well as having the 
experience being surrounded by neighbour countries conducting restrictive asylum 
policy towards Colombian citizens. 
After a general introduction of the conflict in Colombia, I will divide the chapter 
into three parts. First, I will address the principle of sovereignty and whether Colombia’s 
sovereignty has been challenged by the subject of internal displacement and the 
normative development where sovereignty comes with responsibility.  
I will then address the role of the international community, particularly UNHCR, 
who have provided in-country protection to the IDPs, after a request was made by the 
Colombian authorities in June 1997. I will look at the option of seeking asylum and 
whether this is realistic for the IDPs. The attitude of Colombia’s neighbouring countries 
effectively denies IDPs the right to asylum and limits their ability to escape national 
boundaries. Peace societies1 have been tried as an alternative for people who have not 
crossed a border, and there are both successful and failed examples. 
Finally, I will address the IDP legislation in Colombia. Being the fourth country in 
the world in terms of the numbers of IDPs and, ironically, with the best developed 
democratic legal framework intended to protect the IDPs, Colombia should be a good 
illustration of the situation to IDPs. The developed democratic legal framework makes 
Colombia unique in relation to other countries with large numbers of IDPs. But lack of 
success in implementing this legal framework or in offering effective protection to the 
country’s IDPs, raises the questions as to whether Colombia has failed as a sovereign 
state, and whether an international collaborative approach, with the UNHCR as the co-
ordinator, can fill the protection gap in Colombia.  
                                              
1 A Peace Society is for those who are not a ‘Convention Refugee’ and for different reasons have not crossed an 
international border. The objective is to keep the civilian population out of the armed conflict by declaring neutrality and civilian 
autonomy vis-à-vis the armed actors. 
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1.11 The Subject of Internal Displacement–Using a Qualitative Method  
The kind of approach one chooses when answering a thesis depends on what one 
wants to explain. My aim is to provide a greater understanding of the problems that 
impede protection efforts, such as the principle of sovereignty and the limited mandate 
of UNHCR which formally excludes the IDPs, and how these might be overcome. The 
reason I have chosen to look at the protection gap is because it is the biggest gap in 
response to the IDP situation. From a political science perspective it would be natural to 
identify the policy makers responsible for this protection gap and to try to identify who 
can bridge it. Some research on IDPs pursues an actor-oriented approach, which 
emphasises the enabling capacity of the individual, indicating that IDPs may influence 
their own situation even at times of extreme deprivation. However, this should not 
ignore the structural aspect of flight and deprivation (Lund 2001). I have chosen an 
institutional-oriented approach. I will concentrate on both constraining and enabling 
structures when it comes to protection of IDPs. A major challenge lies in finding how to 
assist and protect IDPs as individuals and as a group. The thesis is an empirical question. 
This means that the question is about how a certain issue relates to reality and where 
collection of data can answer this question (Hellevik 1994:391). The aim is to describe 
how the IDP situation actually is in a case where they lack both national and 
international protection. Part of the answer will also be of normative character as I will 
try to pursue what may bridge the protection gap, without knowing if it will be the case.  
Hellevik (1994:14) describes quantitative research method as one where the 
researcher systematically collects comparable information on several research objects of 
a certain kind, expresses this information in forms of numbers, and in the end conducts 
an analysis of the pattern in the numbers. In my case, this work has already been done. 
Even if the numbers are only estimates and they are disputed, they demonstrate the 
increase in numbers of IDPs. Compounding difficulties in obtaining valid numbers are 
the political and security-related constraints in reaching and talking to IDP communities 
(Jacobsen 2001). But there is a general agreement that the increase in numbers of IDPs 
constitutes a challenge to the international community. To analyse what kind of 
challenges IDPs raise, I have chosen a qualitative approach as this will give me the 
possibility to explain the implications of their high and increasing numbers.  
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According to Østerud (et al. 1997:136), there are usually three main reasons for 
choosing qualitative research: 1) the case is too complex and unorganised for using 
quantitative measurements 2) there is not enough knowledge within the area we want to 
research and more exploration is necessary and 3) the actors themselves create their own 
world, and the researcher needs to understand this process with flexibility and through a 
dialogue of understanding. All of these three reasons are relevant for my thesis. The 
subject of internal displacement is a complex one, and my thesis cannot be measured in 
exact numbers. Further, there is a need to continue to explore the area of internal 
displacement. Finally, there is a need for the researcher to be open minded and to 
include both people and organisations working with internal displacement, as well as the 
IDPs themselves in a dialogue. 
Qualitative work has tended to focus on one or a small number of cases, to use 
intensive interviews or depth analyses of historical materials, to be discursive in method, 
and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit. 
This kind of work is sometimes linked with area or case studies where the focus is on a 
particular event, decision, institution, location, issue, or piece of legislation (King, 
Keohane & Verba 1994:4). I have chosen Colombia as case study based on personal 
interviews and in-depth analyses of second hand materials to give a comprehensive 
account of internal displacement in the country.  
The qualitative method always tries to understand a phenomenon in relation to 
other phenomena and as a whole (Madsen 1979:76). By using various ways of collecting 
data, qualitative research offers a deeper understanding of a phenomenon in my case that 
of the situation of IDPs (Andersen 1990:14). I will try to cover different points of view 
regarding the principle of sovereignty and the mandate of UNHCR, and implications the 
subject of IDPs have for these two thematic issues.  
According to Ottar Dahl (1997:51-53) the source’s origin is of importance when 
trying to answer a thesis. However, there may be problems attached to the origin of a 
source: the time and place of origin, purpose, technical environment and the 
circumstances in which the source is delivered to mention a few. To achieve the best 
result, in deciding whether a source is useful or not, it is essential to know its origin and 
work with a group of sources. Information is rarely neutral and there is often vested 
interest in withholding or exaggerating facts and figures. Information is often disputed, 
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even by those closest to the situation. The different points of view often depend on 
where you work and where you live, whether you represent international, national, local 
or personal interests. Who will gain what is often essential for the different actors.  
Data in this thesis includes personal interviews, secondary sources as official 
documents, and observations made in Colombia as an illustration of the area of internal 
displacement. Secondary official documents will provide me with the facts I need to 
answer my thesis, even though this is revised information. Personal interviews have 
offered me first hand information and a deeper understanding of the topic of internal 
displacement, and they have also helped me verify the secondary sources used. A field 
study of Colombia has provided me with both first and second hand sources on the 
subject of internal displacement, and can also help illustrate the situation of the IDPs in 
this country.  
The reliability of sources is of uttermost importance, and can be separated into high 
or low levels of reliability. A high level of reliability means that the collection of data and 
treatment of data, are done with a high level of accuracy. Consequently, a low level of 
reliability implies a low level of accuracy. Equally important is the data’s validity, meaning 
whether the data collected is adequately reliable and relevant to answer the thesis or not. 
When data has high validity, the reliability is high as well, meaning that data collected can 
adequately answer the thesis. However, high reliability does not necessarily mean high 
validity (Hellevik 1994:43). By using several and various sources, such as academic 
scientists, states, the UN, national and international NGOs the intention is to reflect the 
existing range of opinions. I believe this will increase the reliability and validity of the 
sources used to answer my thesis. I hope the information collected to answer my thesis 
is precise and can provide adequate answers-, and that the relevance and the validity of 
this information coincides with the thesis, therefore increasing reliability. I intend for the 
empirical information to cover my thesis (“content validity”) (Rose 1999 [Lecture]), and 
will increase the correspondence between reliability and validity. In Andersen (1990:122), 
Yin defines a case study as an empirical research which throws light on a contemporary 
phenomenon within the framework of reality, where the limits between the 
phenomenon and its relation to where it belongs to is not clear, and where there are 
possibilities to utilise several sources of information to throw light on the phenomenon, 
which in this case is internal displacement.  
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Because of the extremely tense situation in Colombia, it is especially important to 
consider the sources’ origin. The tense situation forces actors to be particular aware of 
the language they use when expressing their opinions. The UN especially has to be 
cautious about their political language when they make a statement on a situation in the 
country as this might challenge the state’s sovereignty. If they are too harsh, they risk 
being denied presence in the country. For the UN contact with the involved actors and 
the access to the field is decisive when collecting reliable data. At the same time, an 
agency like the UN can bring resources to the country, and the government might be 
hesitant to criticise their statements in fear of the consequences. This makes it important 
to compare information from the state with information from non-state actors.  
Regarding internal displacement, national and international NGOs may be the most 
trustworthy source. They are not part of any bureaucracy and can therefore play a more 
independent role than both the state and the UN. They often act more out of idealism 
and independent interests and they are often physically close to the area of research. 
However, it is important not to be naive. Also between NGOs, both national and 
international, there is competition for resources and prestige. Usually, they all need 
external resources to exist as an organisation, and many NGOs receive support not only 
from their own national state, but also from international donors. This is important to 
consider when justifying a source. 
Information from academic researchers should in general also be a reliable source. 
They act out of professional interest, and try to describe the reality. But there are 
different opinions about what constitutes reality. It depends on the basis for the sources, 
the arguments for their claims and their distance to the situation described.  
These are all secondary official documents. In addition I also try to answer my thesis 
with information collected from personal interviews, meaning face to face contact. 
Normally you divide the questions into cognitive and evaluative questions, whether the 
question is about a particular situation or you are asking about feelings the respondent 
may have regarding a particular situation (Hellevik 1994:125). During my stay in 
Colombia, I mainly asked cognitive questions. However, with a situation as tense as the 
one in Colombia, it is almost impossible to avoid noticing the personal feelings of the 
respondent when expressing his or her opinion. To gain as much knowledge as possible, 
I believe it has been beneficial to prepare specific questions in advance. This proves that 
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I have knowledge about the subject I ask questions about, and can be selective in the 
information given. However, I did not use a standard form with questions.  
Personal interviews were conducted in Colombia and concerned the internal 
displacement situation in the country. All respondents have been or are working in 
Colombia on the issue of internal displacement. They represent both the state, the UN, 
national and international NGOs, and some were IDPs themselves. I also spent three 
months as an intern with the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Global IDP Project in 
Geneva, which gave me the opportunity to gain general knowledge on the subject of 
internal displacement. I had access to different kinds of sources, both secondary and first 
hand, and I made contact with people working with internal displacement, both within 
the UN and NGOs.   
When conducting personal interviews it is important to ask where the respondent 
gained his or her information from. How close has the respondent been to the 
information given? How real is the respondent’s engagement and possibility to observe 
the event? The more physically close a source has been to a situation, the easier it is to 
assume its reliability (Dahl 1997:61). However, “first-hand” sources can be influenced by 
other sources. Often the source has talked and discussed with other people, and possibly 
been influenced by that conversation. But this might not mean the source has lost its 
credibility. The influence from others can also mean correction and control of a source 
(Ibid:59). Every statement given is a reproduction or a reconstruction of happenings, not 
a direct part of them. It is also important to ask why the respondent is willing to share 
information. What kind of information did the respondent want to share and what kind 
of message was received by the interviewer (Ibid:62-63)?  
Dahl (1997:64-66) explains the interpretation of the content when conducting an 
interview takes place in several steps. But the most relevant is step 1; the language. Some 
of my interviews were conducted in Spanish, the language of origin of the respondent, 
but my third language. I have taken this into consideration when interpreting the 
answers. To reduce the possibility of misinterpretation or loss of information I have 
made it a point to use several various independent sources and comparing them with 
each other. It is not only an understanding of every single source that is important, but 
equally important is an adequate description of their relationship to each other, especially 
their function as a whole. In this case, using logic and psychological capability, an 
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understanding of language, and the ability to “imagine” the story told and the conditions 
the information is based on, is important.  
I spent three weeks in Colombia, where I had the opportunity to observe issues 
related to internal displacement. I talked to people, both formally and informally. Three 
weeks may not be long, but it gave me the possibility to imagine and understand the 
sources and the subject of internal displacement to a larger extent than if I had not been 
there.  
All sources can lie or be wrong, and alternatively the truth can be hiding in sources 
that originally have little credibility. It is therefore important to compare several 
independent essential sources and confront them with comprehensive theories. If several 
independent sources provide the same information, the reliability is strengthened. 
Corresponding sources can be mutually strengthening of each other, but only of value if 
the sources are independent, and not influenced by one another (Ibid.). By taking these 
issues into consideration when interpreting and comparing several various independent 
well grounded sources, I intend to give an answer which is as reliable and valid as 
possible when answering what challenges the protection gap may raise to the principle of 
sovereignty and the mandate of the UNHCR. 
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2. The Principle of  Sovereignty –Challenged by the 
IDPs? 
2.1  Introduction 
The increase in internal warfare and internal conflicts has led to the idea that the 
national state’s sovereignty is being challenged. The protection of the internally displaced 
becomes directly associated with the question of state sovereignty. National authorities 
have the primary responsibility for addressing the needs of their displaced citizens. 
However, the state often lacks the capacity and sometimes the will to provide them with 
protection and assistance. IDPs, being an internal matter, mean that any attempt to 
create an international agency to address the IDP issue could be seen as implicitly 
interfering in the domestic affairs of states. If the state fails to protect its IDPs, can it 
still claim to be sovereign –in the sense that it does not recognise the need of the IDPs 
and denies the international community access?  
In a formal sense, sovereignty means that state authority is not subject to a higher 
power. Both the formal notion of sovereignty and the correlative norm of non-
interference have been given legal expression in international law2. Werner and De Wilde 
(2001: 284) claim that threats to the state’s autonomy and ability to rule have reinforced 
the claims to sovereignty rather than weakened them. They argue that instead of asking 
what state of affairs “really” corresponds to the idea of sovereignty, one should ask in 
what context a claim to sovereignty is likely to occur, to whom a sovereignty claim is 
addressed, what -if any normative framework is used to determine the legitimacy of a 
sovereignty claim, and what consequences generally follow from the acceptance of a 
sovereignty claim. How does the protection gap affect the principle of sovereignty?  
What kind of responsibility do states have towards IDPs? 
                                              
2 Article 2 (7) allows the UN itself to “intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
State…”, but only through application of Chapter VII enforcement measures by the Security Council, which must first 
“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39). It may then, if 
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2.2 The Balance between Sovereignty and Human Rights 
Achieving a balance between state sovereignty and human rights is no small issue. 
The question is, in what regard can a state claim to be sovereign when human rights are 
being broken within its borders. When a state cannot provide protection to its citizens, 
can it still claim to be sovereign? 
The four decades between 1948 and the collapse of communism may be 
characterised and possibly stigmatised, as the lip-service era for human rights, when 
diplomats strove to ensure that they could never be meaningfully asserted against a 
nation state. Throughout the Cold War diplomats used human rights opportunistically, 
as a propaganda weapon against their enemies. After the Cold War, the European 
Convention and its Strasbourg court were sufficiently impressive for the newly liberated 
nations of Eastern Europe to sign up a membership. By the time of the UN's 
triumphalist talk-fest in Vienna in 1993, there was a much more genuine desire to put 
human rights at the centre of the “New World Order” proclaimed after the apparent 
defeat of Saddam Hussein (Robertson 2000:xv). Part of this “New World Order” is the 
increasing number of IDPs. Are the IDPs a human rights issue? There are multiple 
examples of situations when these human rights are broken as in countries where the 
government has collapsed, and plays a part in the internal conflict, -where the civil 
population is identified as an opponent, -where the national and institutional service are 
non accessible or active counteract, as well as a negative attitude towards the 
international community. Yes, IDPs are a human rights issue.  
IDPs are protected by human rights laws, as all other human beings. But as opposed 
to refugees, women, children and so on, no institution has been given the responsibility 
for IDPs when the state fails to protect its people. In international law, there exists a 
legal principle of forced intervention based on humanitarian suffering which could open 
a Pandora’s Box of uncontrolled interference between states. Most states are very 
reluctant to make the UN a global peace force at the expense of state sovereignty. The 
power of human rights has increased. The breakdown of the Cold War has made it to a 
large extent easier than before for the international community to take part in internal 
                                                                                                                                           
measures short of armed force are insufficient, “take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security” (Article 42) (Robertson 2000:405). 
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relations and observe people’s need. Human rights have to do with social, political and 
economic conditions. There is an increasing international concern for victims of internal 
warfare and human rights. The Cold War made it difficult for the international 
community to cooperate, but today the UN can promote peace and respect for human 
rights. After the Cold War, however, national conflicts seem to be more difficult to 
control, without adjusted legal international principles and instructions on how to handle 
crises in this new situation. 
According to Guy S. Goodwin-Gill (1996:264) the primary responsibility for the 
protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons rests with the territorial state, 
in virtue of its sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. The principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention have a special significance for formerly colonised 
people at a time when the threat of re-colonisation looms large. Any attempt to dilute 
them in the name of the defence and promotion of human rights is therefore viewed 
with understandable suspicion. Such an argument should not be read as supporting an 
absolute doctrine of sovereignty. According to Chimni (2000a:392), the problem is “that 
the invocation of human rights is selective, often a pretext for attaining incompatible ends, and is 
advocated by powers which author global policies irreconcilable with any conception of human rights”. 
In Fixdal and Smith (1998:288) Hoffman writes that for three centuries, the state 
has been the organising principle of political power, political philosophy, and political 
science. And human rights have become a major feature of both political and ethical 
discussion in the late twentieth century (Ibid.). Human rights are firmly established in 
international law. In the growing standing of human rights principles, states recognise 
the sovereignty of peoples and their representative institutions. This is called “popular 
sovereignty” (Barnett 2001:248)3. Thus, the rights of states continue to take priority in the 
law and politics of international human rights. If human rights should be taken seriously 
they must also be a priority. It is easy to get the impression that the UN Human Rights 
Committee is a large and respected organisation, rather than a group of underfunded 
part-timers which is the reality. Today, human rights are much in fashion, which makes 
them the subject of a certain amount of humbug. In a world where virtue is no longer its 
                                              
3 In Barnett (2001:248) Reisman and Frank explains that popular sovereignty concerns the domestic principles that we 
now define as the rule of law (liberalism) and representative institutions (democracy). 
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own reward, there are plenty of human rights awards, many funded by corporations 
exposed for exploiting the poor. The UN can be accused of cheapening the human 
rights cause by recruiting voguish but vapid models and pop stars as “goodwill 
ambassadors” (Robertson 2000:xx-xxi).  
The disagreement mainly concerns how deep the limits on state sovereignty are. 
How much will IDPs need to suffer before receiving protection from the international 
community? It may seem that sovereignty will always recede in the background and 
borders will constitute barriers, but it is important to take advantage of the 
internationalist vision of the principle of human rights, work within the existing 
mechanism of cooperation developed at the international level through the UN (Mishra 
2000). It may be an idea to develop a framework and criteria that can be used to 
determine to what extent human rights can be broken before the international 
community can intervene. The aim should be to develop a tool that establishes new 
standards that make governments accountable. The right of a humanitarian intervention 
arises in an emergency, to stop the continuing commission of crimes against humanity, 
but it has never been suggested that a state’s poor human rights record justify armed 
intervention (Robertson 2000). We can also place this discussion in the context of the 
allies; United States, Britain and Spain’s military intervention into Iraq March 2003, 
where there clearly are disagreements as to whether the intervention has a legitimate 
basis. 
In Fixdal and Smith (1998:292) the legitimate authority is discussed, where 
Wallensteen mentions that at issue is whether a state that has not collapsed may 
nonetheless be illegitimate. If such is the case, it can be argued that the UN Security 
Council can decide to disregard the claim to sovereignty. According to McCarthy, states 
have rights only if they promote the rights and welfare of their citizens, while Pastor 
argue that in this perspective, sovereignty is beside the point: the real issue is how to 
meet the needs of the world’s citizens (Ibid:294). The human rights movement may be 
on the offensive, but it still has far to go yet. There is no clear answer on how 
irresponsibly a sovereign state can act towards its citizens before it is held accountable by 
the international community.  
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2.3  Sovereignty as Responsibility  
The subject of internal displacement is a sensitive one as it inherently raises the issue 
of sovereignty. The meaning and practice of sovereignty is more complicated than 
defining sovereignty by the principle of non-interference. At issue is not only who is 
sovereign, but what practices are associated with sovereignty (Barnett 2001). Therefore, a 
key question is how it is possible to address the plight of internally displaced in a highly 
and increasingly politicized human rights context. Internal displacement poses a 
challenge to the international community to develop norms, institutions, and 
mechanisms for preventing it, addressing its consequences, and finding durable 
solutions, with the responsibility of sovereignty as the starting point. In recent years, the 
old concept of sovereignty, behind which states have hidden while they abuse their own 
citizens, is gradually being replaced by a newer model “sovereignty as responsibility”, 
which is being promoted by, among others, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, as well 
as by Francis Deng, the UN Secretary-General’s Representative on Internally Displaced 
Persons (Vincent 2001b). According to Deng a state is sovereign as long as the people 
are sovereign, and sovereignty must be viewed as something positive (Deng 2003 
[Personal Interview]).  
Against the classic view, put forward by Pease and Forsythe in Fixdal and Smith 
(1998:294) that the state “has the ultimate legal right to say what should be done within its 
jurisdiction”, Michael Reisman proposes that international law still protects sovereignty, 
but it “is the people’s sovereignty rather than the country’s sovereignty” (Ibid.). Under the old 
concept, even scrutiny of international human rights without the permission of the 
sovereign could arguably constitute a violation of sovereignty by its “invasion” of the 
sovereign domain reserve. The actual respect for human rights has not become 
universal, but today there are fewer states or respected opinion leaders who will find 
arguments justifying systematic human rights abuses in the name of revolutionary 
ideologies or political expediency (Hieronymi 1999:4). Under the old concept, even the 
scrutinizing of international human rights, without the permission of the sovereign could 
arguably constitute a violation of sovereignty by its “invasion” of the sovereign’s domain 
reserve. The UN Charter replicates the ‘domestic jurisdiction –international concern’ 
dichotomy, but not many serious scholars still supports the contention that internal 
human rights are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ and hence 
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insulated from international law. An exception is China that remains deeply suspicious of 
any international legal development which threatens sovereignty. The mildest criticism 
against sovereignty at the UN Human Rights Commission it condemns as interference in 
China’s internal affairs (Wilkinson 1999). But you can also turn the question of 
sovereignty around and ask why sovereignty can be seen as license to commit crimes 
against humanity. 
If states fails to meet their obligations or to invite or welcome international 
assistance, and masses of their people suffer, then they must expect the international 
community to show concern and perhaps even threaten intervention. Such intervention 
can range from persuasive diplomatic intercession, to more assertive political and 
economic measures in the form of sanctions, to the coercive form of military 
intervention in extreme cases. The best way of guaranteeing state sovereignty is to 
discharge the responsibilities of sovereign towards the citizens and all those under the 
jurisdiction of the state. It is important to view sovereignty as something positive (Deng 
2003 [Personal Interview]). 
This contemporary change in content of the term ‘sovereignty’ also changes the cast 
of characters who can violate human rights when an outside forced invades and imposes 
its will on the people. But what happens to sovereignty, in its modern sense, when it is 
not an outsider but some home-grown specialist in violence who seizes and purports to 
wield the authority of the government against the wishes of the people, which is often 
the case in countries with IDPs? Is such a seizure of power entitled to invoke the 
international legal term ‘national sovereignty’ to establish or reinforce its own position in 
international politics? For instance, until the mid-1990s, Zimbabwe was grouped among 
the more prosperous and politically stable countries in Africa, but has since then seen 
both her economy, social and political stability deteriorate. Population movements, both 
voluntary and forced, have become an increasingly visible aspect of the new situation. 
People have been forced to move because of political violence, both separate from and 
closely linked to the controversial land acquisition programme implemented by the 
Government. There have been indications that several thousand people have been 
forced to seek protection away from their homes, but still with-in the country, because 
of their affiliation with the opposition movement during elections in 2000 and 2002 
(Global IDP Project 2002b). Zimbabwe is party to most major international human 
 23
rights law (HRW 2002a:36), including those that form the basis for the UN Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, and has thus a clear obligation to protect its 
population from being displaced and to provide protection and humanitarian assistance 
after displacement. But the political climate in Zimbabwe has made it difficult to raise 
the issues of political violence and the effects of the accelerated land reform process 
with the government. International organisations tend to avoid confrontations with the 
government and even the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has so far not 
responded to the situation (ICG  2002a).  
According to Fixdal and Smith (1998:288-289), it is an empirical and analytical error 
to assume that the age of sovereign states is coming to an end. Presently there are more 
sovereign states than there have ever been, and they keep appearing, the latest with the 
independence of East Timor in 2002.  According to Nils Butenschøn (2001:3), we have 
to accept the principle of sovereignty and its power. The point is not to argue whether 
the state should be weak or strong, but rather if criteria for a responsible state have been 
created. Sovereignty is necessary, but it is also a dangerous tool. That is why he argues 
that the principle of sovereignty and the system, which the principles maintain, should 
be both criticised and defended.  
To say that states have a right to act in certain areas is not to say that anything they 
do in those areas is right (Walzer 1983:40). By trying to shift the fulcrum of the system 
from the protection of sovereigns to the protection of people, it works qualitative 
changes in virtually every component. According to Reisman in Chimni (2000a:410) 
many of the old terms will survive, but in using them in a modern context, one should 
bear in mind Holme’s lapidary dictum: “A word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged; it is 
the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances 
and the time in which it is used”. When constitutive changes such as these are introduced 
into a legal system while many other struts of the system are left in place, appliers and 
interpreters of current cases should not proceed in a piecemeal and mechanical fashion. 
Precisely because the human rights norms are constitutive, other norms must be 
reinterpreted in their light, lest anachronisms be produced.  
When people’s rights are not being respected, they look to their homeland not only 
with hope, but also with expectations. Such expectations are legitimate. But where can 
the IDPs look for hope, when states split?  No legal appeal is possible; there is no 
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superior body. There is a discrepancy between the rhetoric and action, whereas most 
states recognise obligations towards IDPs and refugees in practice, some do so only in 
law. This can be seen as a debate between idealism and realism. Idealism is a shorthand 
term for a process by which an ethical response to a large-scale tragedy is first aroused 
and then translated into political action. Meanwhile, realism emerges in the recognition 
that the actors in the multilateral operations are the governments of states, acting out of 
a mix of short- and long-term interests (Fixdal and Smith 1998:284).  
There may be no ultimately satisfactory general answer to the question of legitimate 
authority. Urgent relief resources sent by outsiders are usually welcomed by the 
government in control of the territory. If not, as in the case of Zimbabwe, then that 
resistance almost always bespeaks an element of political oppression that probably 
should itself bring the deprivation within the classic contours of the UN definition, as 
traditionally understood (Martin 1991:39). In Werner and De Wilde (2001:291) both 
Jackson, James and Mayall argue that sovereignty can only exist by virtue of mutual 
recognition between governments. Its functions are regulative and authoritative. If states 
are incapable of discharging responsibilities towards all those under state jurisdiction, 
they are expected to request, or at least accept, international cooperation in providing 
assistance and protection. It is on this basis that states can best guarantee their 
sovereignty (Deng 1998:8). 
2.4 A State’s Responsibility Towards IDPs 
A responsible diplomat would argue that the very purpose of a legal definition of 
IDPs is to narrow the scope for abuse, and international law would be an obscenity if it 
required the world to turn its back rather than act to save the lives of thousands of men, 
women and children, merely because they were located in an unco-operative sovereign 
state. But state practice has been the most potent, and has become the most problematic, 
source of international law. A problem is that states rarely consent, genuinely and 
voluntarily, to external limits on their power over their own people (Robertson 2000:89). 
Rather than tackling the basic problems, as the underlying causes of the conflicts, and 
finding political solutions, states tend to become involved themselves in humanitarian 
activities or to direct their funds at specific areas without any coordination and without 
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any comprehension of the phenomenon of vulnerability as a whole. This attitude can 
only be detrimental and indeed fuel new conflicts. It could therefore seem reasonable to 
argue that humanitarian action, which is intended to protect human dignity and save 
lives, should on no account be used as a substitute for political decisions (Hickel 
2001:54).  
The turning point in states’ responsibility towards IDPs came with the Gulf and 
Yugoslavian Wars. Both the Kurdish population and people in Yugoslavia were denied 
the exit option. The European countries limited the numbers of refugees, but not 
wanting to appear completely heartless, the European states encouraged UNHCR to 
provide relief for IDPs. In short, states slowly approved the concept of IDPs not 
because of an abundance of humanitarianism but because of its very absence (Barnett 
2001:267).  
The question of protection is obviously associated with the question of whose 
mandate it is. In fact, the state under whose jurisdiction IDPs live or are compelled to 
live is supposed to be the protector of its citizens; thus IDPs are insecure because the 
very expected protector is either unable or unwilling to protect them. In a situation like 
this, IDPs fall into a vacuum of responsibility within the state. This failure of the state in 
its obligation towards its citizens is the main cause that draws the attention of the 
international community and subsequently demands its protection role. However, there 
is also the opinion that over-eagerness to promote international involvement may in 
many ways dilute the notion of state responsibility. Hence, rebuilding the state’s capacity 
by adopting various measures is also considered an essential process toward safeguarding 
IDPs. The very notion of this process of building up the state’s responsibility is intended 
to make the state or government or other actors agree to certain principles as a first step, 
and secondly, make them act in a way that is conducive to the prevention and resolution 
of the internal displacement problem (Chakma 2000:228).  
At the annual General Assembly meeting in 1999, the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan urged UN member states to put aside sovereignty and the sanctity of national 
borders -in favour of protecting and assisting civilians caught in the crossfire of war. 
“There is no doubt that enforcement action is a difficult step to take. It often goes against political or 
other interests, but there are universal principles and values which supersede such interests, and the 
protection of civilians is one of them”, Annan told delegates (Wilkinson 1999). 
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It was one of the most controversial speeches by a Secretary-General in recent 
history and sharply split member states. In support of Annan, the French Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin said to the General Assembly that the UN mission is not limited to the 
settlement of conflicts among states and that the mission extends to defending human 
dignity within each state and, where necessary, against states. Also, the Netherlands 
Foreign Minister Jozias Van Aartswen agreed. He said that respect for human rights 
since the end of World War Two had become more and more mandatory and respect 
for sovereignty less and less stringent. But there were also opposition viewpoints. China 
vehemently opposed a liberal western view. Foreign Minister Tang Jaxuan argued that it 
seemed vogue that human rights had precedence over sovereignty. He claimed respect 
for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs where the basic 
principles governing international relations and any other approach would lead to the 
imposition of old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy in world relations. Algerian President 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika told delegates they did not deny the UN the right and duty to help 
suffering humanity, but he remained extremely sensitive to any undermining of state 
sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is the last defence against the rules of an 
unequal world, but because he is not taking part in the decision-making process of the 
Security Council. His view reflected the concerns of many developing countries where 
humanitarian agencies do the bulk of their work, that stronger nations would “impose” 
solutions on them (Ibid.). 
2.5 Conclusion 
The increase in internal warfare and internal conflicts has lead to the increase of 
IDPs. The protection of IDPs becomes directly associated with the question of state 
sovereignty. The fact that IDPs are an internal matters, mean that any attempt to create 
an international agency to address the IDP issue could be seen as interfering in the 
domestic affairs of states, if the state has not explicitly asked for or accepted their 
presence. The IDPs and the protection gap clearly challenge the traditional concept of 
sovereignty and there is a need to rethink the traditional notion of sovereignty, 
particularly the balance between state sovereignty and human rights, which is no small 
issue. IDPs are a human rights issue in countries where the government either has 
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collapsed or is part of the internal conflict. Even if states are reluctant to agree to 
anything at the expense of state sovereignty, they are today more pressured by the 
international community. The power of human rights has increased. In the growing 
standing of human rights principles, states recognize the sovereignty of peoples and their 
representative institutions, which is called “popular sovereignty”. The breakdown of the 
Cold War has made it easier for the international community to take part in internal 
relations to a greater degree than earlier, which also opens up the opportunity for 
international responsibility. However, the rights of states continue to take priority in the 
law and politics of international human rights.  
The protection gap has affected the practices associated with sovereignty. A new 
trend has developed and the question is if it can be reflected in international law. The old 
concept of sovereignty is gradually being replaced by a newer model, sovereignty as 
responsibility. Sovereignty should be perceived in terms of the protection and respect of 
the rights of their citizens and promotion of international peace and security. The 
willingness by states to elevate the legitimating principle of popular sovereignty is 
strongly associated with the belief that there is a direct relationship between international 
order and domestic order (Barnett 2001). But it may be an error assuming that the age of 
sovereign states is coming to an end, rather it is important to discuss premises of a 
responsible state. There may be no ultimately satisfactory general answer to the question 
of legitimate authority, but if states are incapable of discharging responsibilities towards 
all those under state jurisdiction, they are expected to request or at least accept 
international cooperation in providing assistance and protection. 
With the Gulf and Yugoslavian Wars, states slowly approved the concept of IDPs, 
not necessarily because of humanitarianism, but rather through trying to hinder refugees 
from entering their own country. It could also happen that over-eagerness to promote 
international involvement may dilute the notion of state responsibility, but it may also be 
considered as an essential process toward safeguarding IDPs. Northern states have every 
incentive to dry up refugee flows at source, if possible by containing people within their 
borders. Delivering aid and protection may be cheaper than dealing with huge increases 
in the numbers of asylum-seekers. Dispossessed by their own national authorities, IDPs’ 
only source of protection and assistance becomes the international community. With the 
increased focus on human rights as responsibility, there should be possibilities for the 
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international community to show legitimate concern, if the state itself has failed in 
protecting its citizens.  
The protection gap has made states’ lack of responsibility and shortcomings in 
meeting their obligations more visible on the international arena. As borders weaken in a 
globalizing age, the importance of IDPs will come to rival that of refugees and the duty 
of outsiders to do something should become all the more obvious. But without adjusted 
legal international principles and instructions for how to handle crises in this new 
situation, the protection gap will still exist. International law, unlike municipal law, 
cannot be said to rule. Standards laid down by independent states may in practice be 
ignored, which they often are, without suffering anything more than diplomatic 
embarrassment. The aim should be to develop an instrument that establishes new 
standards that make governments accountable. 
There have been attempts to create an international agency to address the IDP issue 
without meddling in the domestic affairs of states. It was suggested that UNHCR should 
take on this responsibility. But many disagree with this suggestion. The next chapter will 
discuss the role of the UNHCR in relation to the increase of IDPs and the protection 
gap. 
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3. The Increasing Need for Protection: A Dilemma for  
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)  
3.1 Introduction 
From chapter two we can conclude that normative developments have taken place, 
in the sense that there is more pressure on a sovereign state to behave responsibly, and 
there has been an increase in the acceptance of international involvement if this 
responsibility is absent. UNHCR is not immune to global developments such as the 
increase in internal conflicts and a more restrictive asylum policy. The end of the Cold 
War and changes in world politics have had consequences not only for state sovereignty 
but also for the work done by the UNHCR, since its own primary responsibility is 
defined by inter alia, reference to flight. UNHCR was established to help states carry out 
their responsibilities to refugees, but obligations were carefully limited and it was ensured 
that UNHCR’s working definition of humanitarianism included the principle of non-
interference (Barnett 2001).  
It is the combination of state pressures and normative developments that have 
permitted UNHCR to become more involved in the domestic affairs of states. UNHCR 
has extended protection or assistance to certain groups who were not included in 
UNHCR’s original mandate, but whom the UN Secretary-General or the UN General 
Assembly have requested that the agency assist.  Among these groups are an estimated 
5.3 million IDPs, the fastest growing group of uprooted persons in the world (UNHCR 
2002a). 
But the extent to which UNHCR wants to find itself attempting to save failed states 
is a matter of debate. I would like to address the challenges the agency meets in the 
matter of IDPs. The question is whether this political transformation which enables the 
agency to become more deeply involved in the internal affairs of states actually protects 
the IDPs? Are there practical, political, and principled reasons for distancing UNHCR 
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from the problems of the internally displaced, other than as a functional extension of 
refugee-related activities? I will review the changing relationship between the principle of 
sovereignty and the UNHCR, and link this to the emergence of a new international 
refugee regime and whether protection of IDPs is out of bounds for the UNHCR.  
3.2 UNHCR in a New Refugee Regime 
The Office of the UNHCR was established on December 14, 1950 by the UN 
General Assembly. The agency is mandated to lead and coordinate international action 
to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. UNHCR is the principal 
guardian of the 1951 Refugee Convention. But the agency’s Statute has been interpreted 
flexibly to allow it to work with IDPs. Article 9 states that the High Commissioner may, 
in addition to work with refugees “engage in such activities…as the General Assembly may 
determine, within the limits of the resources placed at her disposal”. The most frequent restraints 
on UNHCR involvement is lack of security and refusal of access to the displaced by 
governments and other insurgents (UNHCR 2003a and UNHCR 2003b). 
UNHCR has been careful not to compromise its own mandate covering refugees 
and to work within its limited financial and manpower resources. But since the end of 
the Cold War a new refugee agenda has developed. The dynamics of displacement have 
changed greatly over the half-century of UNHCR’s existence, and consequently 
international responses to the problem of forced displacement. UNHCR’s early 
development took place in the tense climate of the Cold War, when the organisation 
focused on refugees in Europe. The end of bipolar confrontation at the beginning of the 
1990s profoundly altered the universe in which UNHCR operated (UNHCR 2000). The 
new humanitarianism is causing the erosion of the fundamental principles of refugee 
protection and is transforming the character of UNHCR (Chimni 2000b). As a result of 
the changing dynamics of displacement, millions of IDPs throughout the world live 
scattered in the jungle, huddled in camps or hiding in the anonymity of urban slums. 
Their masses cover the dark side of the world refugee problem. UNHCR’s involvement 
with IDPs, has become increasingly significant over the last decade, a reflection, in many 
instances, of the changing environment in which the UNHCR has had to carry out even 
its more traditional activities, in particular the voluntary repatriation of refugees 
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(UNHCR 1994). But until recently its involvement with IDPs had mostly been in the 
context of the voluntary repatriation of refugees where return movements and 
rehabilitation and reintegration programmes have included both refugees and displaced 
persons in circumstances where it was neither reasonable nor feasible to treat the two 
categories differently (Chimni 2000b:260). 
In 1994, Leonardo Franco, the Director of International Protection in UNHCR, 
made clear that 
“legal categories and institutional mandates retain all their relevance. But at the same time, 
UNHCR increasingly finds it operationally untenable, as well as morally objectionable to consider only 
the more visible facet of a situation of coerced displacement. A comprehensive approach to coerced human 
displacement does not mean, however, that UNHCR should employ broad generalisations and 
undifferentiated treatment. No two humanitarian crises are ever the same, and a global approach to such 
complex situations requires, if anything, finer tools of analyses and a larger arsenal of flexible responses” 
(UNHCR 1994).  
An evaluation of the UNHCR’s involvement with IDPs in 1994, concluded that 
given the magnitude and scope of the problem and the inadequate ad hoc response thus 
far, there seems to be international consensus that an institutional mechanism to cope 
with the displacement phenomenon is urgently required. Although initially set up as a 
temporary institution, essentially intended to wrap up the refugee problems remaining 
after the Second World War and in the late 1940s, UNHCR has acquired quasi-
permanent status, as well as universal support, even among those initially opposed to the 
“politics” of refugee protection. In a practical sense, UNHCR’s protection and solution 
responsibilities take place in a context that is increasingly likely to involve the provision 
of material assistance, either short –or long-term, the uncertain availability of durable 
solutions dependent, as always, on the political will of states, weaknesses in the system of 
ensuring compliance with international obligations, and increasing resource demands. 
UNHCR’s work is intended, indeed required, to be humanitarian, social and non-
political, but it clearly takes place in a political context, frequently characterised by 
tension between the national and international arms of protection, between sovereignty 
and international responsibility (Goodwin-Gill 1999: 221-222). 
Insecurity impels people to flee in search of refuge, but the persistence of conflict 
and displacement has weakened the commitment of many states to uphold international 
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agreed principles of refugee protection (UNHCR 2000). Today the concept of security 
now provides UNHCR with conceptual coherence for its post-Cold War transformation 
from, in its own words, a ‘reactive exile-oriented and refugee-specific’ paradigm to a 
‘proactive, homeland-oriented and holistic’ one. UNHCR is one of the world’s largest 
humanitarian relief agencies, with staff operating in conflict zones to assist and protect 
people in or near their homes so that they need not flee across international boundaries. 
UNHCR’s security discourse provides the legitimisation for this new paradigm by 
explaining that refugee flows must be prevented, contained and reversed because of the 
security threats such flows create for the social cohesion, political integrity and economic 
welfare of the host states, regional and international stability, humanitarian workers and 
the refugee themselves. As discussed in chapter two the change of focus from state to 
people’s sovereignty has also influenced UNHCR.  
Security is one of UNHCR’s most important concepts, and in the 1990s it has 
moved from being a peripheral to a core concern. Despite this, UNHCR’s usage of the 
term security is ambivalent. It is often difficult to assess what meaning the agency 
attaches to ‘security’ and with whose security it is concerned when it talks about ‘human 
security’4, ‘national security’ and ‘international peace and security’ (Hammerstad 
2000:396). An article prepared by UNHCR’s Policy Research Unit exemplifies 
UNHCR’s effort to redefine security in humanitarian and human rights terms: 
It is interesting to note that the notion of security itself has been reformulated since the 
demise of the bipolar state system. Until the late 1980s, analysts applied the concept of 
security almost exclusively to states. Today however, it is also used in relation to the 
welfare of individuals and groups of people (Hammerstad 2000:397). 
 
By stating that “unless people feel secure in their own homes, the security of states will continue to 
be threatened by internal tensions and refugee flows”, UNHCR tries to establish harmony 
between the security concern of states and the protection needs of displaced people 
(Ibid.). Roberta Cohen (2001) emphasises that situations of conflict and displacement 
rarely remain confined within borders. They spill over into neighbouring countries and 
can upset regional stability, thereby often compelling a regional response. Regional 
activity is also essential because of the influence regional powers can have in encouraging 
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governments in their regions to assume their responsibilities toward their internally 
displaced population. In 1996, South Centre in Geneva argued that a reason for concern 
is that crisis with important humanitarian implications, such as internal displacement, are 
generally regarded as individual, isolated events, to be dealt with on an emergency basis 
to stem the damage. There is no general international policy on how to act on internal 
displacement. In addition to reflecting the inadequacy and inappropriateness of 
development policies themselves, it signals the past inability or unwillingness of the 
international community to help create the broader conditions that would help prevent 
such crisis and conflicts, as well as its failure to take practical steps to pre-empt or to 
help defuse such crisis (Chimni 2000a:417). 
UNHCR has been acutely aware of the emergence of more restrictive and hostile 
attitudes towards refugees in the post-Cold War period. In Fixdal and Smith (1998:293), 
David Scheffer argues that refugee flows and the prospect of conflict spilling over 
international borders mean that massive violations of human rights and internal conflicts 
inevitably have an impact on regional and international security. Despite the efforts of 
UNHCR and other human security advocates, states and, consequently, the Security 
Council have been hesitant to broaden the definition of ‘threats to peace and security’ 
and emphasise the connection between the security of people and that of states and 
regions. There is yet little consensus among Security Council members or other states on 
whether or how the category of threats to international security should be expanded. 
There is genuine suspicion, especially among developing states, that human security 
arguments may function as a disguise for legitimising the imperialist and interventionist 
ambitions of international or regional powers.  
There have been disputes about the UNHCR’s mandate, the role it can play in 
providing assistance and protection to IDPs, whether its mandate should be extended to 
include also the IDPs, and not only refugees. Some have applauded and encouraged 
UNHCR for addressing humanitarian needs on a more comprehensive basis, others have 
accused UNHCR of undermining the institution of asylum without being able to ensure 
effective protection within borders (Horekens 1999:17). Issues to be addressed in a new 
refugee agenda include UNHCR’s competence with respect to the internally displaced, 
                                                                                                                                           
4 Human security for individuals. 
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the criteria, the nature and content of UNHCR’s involvement, and the complementary 
roles of other international organisations (Chimni 2000a). 
3.3 Towards In-Country Protection? 
At the end of the Cold War, concern grew within the UNHCR that it would no 
longer have a significant role to play in the post-Cold War period. But looking back at 
the many refugee crises and the substantial expansion of UNHCR’s operational scope 
and budget in the 1990s, this concern seems misplaced. Today, according to 
Hammerstad (2000:391), UNHCR has been described as the UN's ‘humanitarian arm’, 
and its primary focus has shifted from providing international protection for refugees, 
particularly in the form of promoting asylum, towards large-scale humanitarian 
operations, in the midst of conflict, for war-affected populations, IDPs and refugee alike.  
A number of questions may be raised to facilitate the critical evaluation of the 
guidelines which the UNHCR outlines for providing assistance and protection to IDPs: 
would UNHCR’s increasing involvement with IDPs detract from the possibility of those 
displaced to seek and obtain asylum? Is a transformation from a refugee to a 
humanitarian organisation being dictated by the aim of the powerful donor states to keep 
potential refugees at home? Should it support standards, which focus on IDPs without 
attempting to fill at first the gaps which exist in refugee protection? In all these respects 
the UNHCR may well find, as Petrasek express it, that ‘the shield of IDP protection turns into 
a sword for undermining refugee protection’ (Chimni 2000a:398).  
Apart political barriers such as sovereignty, there are also other operational obstacles 
to working with IDPs. Sometimes, because of ongoing conflict, collection of data for use 
in future work in the affected areas may become very difficult and may become an 
impediment to any humanitarian assistance process. Working with IDPs can also mean 
working under dangerous conditions, often near or even in the middle of a combat zone 
–much closer, in any case, to the battlefield than any refugee camp (Chakma 2000:229). 
Even though there is an improvement in the protection provided within countries, there 
are clearly obstacles which UNHCR needs to deal with in order to continue expanding 
in-country protection.  
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Some have argued that the UNHCR has strayed from its original mandate and “lost 
its soul” (Horekens 1999:15). Although the basic mandate of the High Commissioner of 
Refugees under the Statue of the Office (General Assembly res. 428 (v)) does not 
include any general competence for persons displaced within their own country, the 
effect of various General Assembly resolutions has been to confer upon UNHCR a 
selective and limited mandate to undertake humanitarian assistance and protection 
activities on behalf of the displaced. In 1994, UNHCR developed guidelines and criteria 
for its involvement with IDPs. The internally displaced who are of potential concern to 
the UNHCR are those in a refuge-like situation, for example, persons fleeing 
persecution, armed conflict or civil strife, rather than victims of physical disasters, such 
as earthquakes, floods or nuclear power-plant expositions. UNHCR’s limited mandate to 
undertake activities on behalf of the internally displaced is both conditional and, in 
principle, discretionary. There are certain preconditions that must be satisfied before 
UNHCR considers its involvement: it must not in any way detract from the possibility to 
seek and to obtain asylum; UNHCR must have full and unhindered access to the 
affected population; adequate provision must be made for the security of staff of 
UNHCR and its operating partners and for acceptable operating conditions; and 
UNHCR’s involvement should have the consent of all concerned parties and enjoy the 
support of the international community (Chimni 2000a:436).  
But UNHCR emphasises that it must be recognised that the most serious problems 
with respect to the protection of persons who are either displaced or threatened with 
displacement in their own country result not from an absence or deficiency of legal 
norms but from the failure of the parties concerned to respect and to enforce those 
norms, and, even more fundamentally, from the failure of warring parties, and of the 
international community as a whole, to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflicts that 
are the major cause of forced displacement. Any effective legal system must include both 
norms of conduct and some mechanism to ensure their observance or enforcement. The 
existing international legal framework to ensuring observance of human rights principles 
and of humanitarian law is clearly not fully adequate to the task. It should be noted, that 
together with the ICRC, UNHCR is the only international organisation to combine 
humanitarian assistance and protection mandates (Ibid:437-439). But it is worth 
emphasising that UNHCR’s mandate is not to provide food and relief to the needy, but 
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to provide protection. Other agencies are responsible for meeting human and material 
needs. Monitoring of the human rights situation falls outside the responsibility of the 
UNHCR. That such issues are not resolved on the basis of established principles, 
however, speaks even more eloquently to the existence of major organisational 
weaknesses (Goodwin-Gill 1999).  
Notwithstanding the specificity of its responsibility to provide international 
protection, UNHCR asserted its own comprehensiveness: “UNHCR…is the only agency 
whose responsibility is to meet all humanitarian needs of its concern, as opposed to responsibilities defined 
by nature of need, age or gender”. According to Goodwin-Gill (1999:233) it was either 
unfortunate or significant that UNHCR neglected to mention that its own primary 
responsibility is defined by, inter alia, reference to flight.  
The High Commissioner of Refugees Ruud Lubber, Sadako Ogata’s successor, 
wants to concentrate on legal refugees alone, although he accepts that, as part of the 
‘UN-family’, his organisation must take note of IDPs. He is cautious about trying to help 
too many. There is a risk, he thinks, that refugee rights could be blurred if extra help 
goes to those who have not crossed a border. UNHCR’s statute makes clear where its 
responsibilities lie, even if, on the ground, it is sometimes very hard to distinguish official 
refugees from the internally displaced (The Economist 2001a). 
3.4 Seeking Asylum -is it an Option for IDPs? 
It is argued that the change in the policy of asylum has increased the total number 
of IDPs. Many states have done little more than fulfil their international law duty, which 
means not returning asylum seekers to dangerous states or territory. However, there is 
no doubt that the principle of non-refoulement is an important constraint on state 
sovereignty. But as the primary basis for how states should respond to rising numbers of 
people forced from their homeland, it has proven hopelessly inadequate. Many states 
have simply avoided its full demands by using indiscriminate measures, such as visas and 
carriers sanctions, to prevent asylum seekers from arriving at frontiers where they could 
claim entry. Worse still, the principle does nothing to encourage states to deal with the 
actual causes of forced migration, particularly those states that are not faced with large 
numbers of asylum applicants (Gibney 1999:169-70). Also, some countries of origin 
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impose strict exit control measures, which makes it impossible for refugees even to leave 
their countries without help (Türk 2001:90). 
After the Cold War, rich and powerful states, particularly in Europe, increasingly 
wish to deter refugees and asylum-seekers from crossing their borders, which has 
therefore increased the numbers of IDPs. The reasons for this is a mix of reduced 
demand and increased supply: in spite of the ageing populations of Western Europe, 
immigrants, including refugees, are no longer seen as a welcome contribution to national 
workforces, refugees are no longer strategically important geopolitical pawns or 
ideological trump cards for the hostility against people from other cultures and of other 
colours which has manifested itself in the electoral successes of anti-immigration, 
extreme rightwing parties (Hammerstad 2000:393). 
There is a consensus among both states and refugee studies scholars that the 
international refugee regime is in crisis. The crisis manifests itself in this restrictive 
asylum policy. These restrictive measures have been adopted without any consultations 
with the states of the South hemisphere. This unilateralism of Northern states has had 
an impact on core refugee protection principles. The 1951 Convention recognises the 
international scope of refugee crises and the necessity of international cooperation, 
including burden-sharing among states, in tackling the problem. Instead of accepting the 
principle of burden sharing, the Northern states increasingly practice burden shifting. 
Countries around the world, including some in Europe, believe they are being 
overwhelmed by asylum seekers. And while it is true that numbers have increased 
inexorably in the last few decades in many areas, the concerns of individual states are not 
equal. Most burdened are nations in Africa and Asia, which have far fewer economic 
resources than industrialised countries and, sometimes host larger numbers of refugees 
for far longer periods of time (UNHCR 2003e). In 1996, the South Centre in Geneva 
expressed concern over the Security Council’s assumption of exclusive responsibility for 
emergencies reflecting a dominant role to those countries from the North with a 
permanent seat. Moreover, it reduces the range of possible approaches to dealing with a 
complex crisis, since Security Council members and particularly its key permanent 
members tend to see such matters essentially in military terms and on the basis of their 
own strategic considerations (Chimni 2000a:419). But in the face of the manifold 
developments in international politics, the international refugee regime cannot be 
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insulated from change. This raises the question of how then change is to be brought 
about (Ibid. 2001:152). Is it by a stronger policy of asylum, in the sense that protection 
abroad is replaced by rejection, and if so, will those who reject refugees, mostly 
Northern countries, compensate by focusing more on in-country protection?  
3.5 The Principle of Asylum -Protection Replaced by Rejection 
A more restrictive asylum policy has led to an increase of IDPs. It is difficult today 
to enter countries with the purpose of seeking asylum. One of the dilemmas regarding 
the principle of asylum is on the one hand, that everyone must have a place to live, and a 
place where a reasonably secure life is possible. On the other hand, this is not a right that 
can be enforced against particular host states. According to Walzer (1983:50-51), the 
right cannot be enforced in practice until there is an authority, which would intervene 
against the states whose brutal policies had driven their own citizens into exile. Why be 
concerned only with men and women who have crossed a border and who ask to 
remain, and not with men and women oppressed in their own countries who ask to 
come in? Why mark off the lucky or the aggressive, who have somehow managed to 
make their way across our borders, from all the others? Walzer has no adequate answer 
to these questions. But the right to restrain the flow remains a feature of communal self-
determination, and this self-determination is more utilised today than ever before.  
In 1995, Chimni wrote that a paradigm shift has taken place in two separate but 
overlapping stages which have quickly succeeded, and therefore continue to 
complement, each other. In the first phase the language of protection was replaced by 
the reality of rejection. A whole host of restrictive laws and practices were and are being 
put in place: visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, and restrictive interpretations of the 1951 
UN definition. This necessitated the second phase of couching the reality of rejection in 
a language which conceals the discourse of power in humanitarian concepts and phrases. 
It has spawned a new vocabulary: the right to remain, on-site assistance, on-site 
inspection, relief corridors, and of course ‘safety zone’. States will ensure that people do 
not flee, that they remain at any cost. So if a person does not manage to cross an 
international border, what may the alternatives be (Chimni 2000a:440-441)? 
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3.6 Safety Zone –an Alternative to Asylum?  
As a measure to sustain the political will necessary not only for retaining asylum as a 
legal entitlement, but also for broader efforts that are nearly always viewed as optional 
political responses rather than legally mandated entitlements, one option is the creation 
of a safe haven or safety zone, for are for those who are not Convention refugees, 
meaning those who have not crossed an international border. It is no accident that 
UNHCR faces its most wrenching funding crisis at the time that its traditional donors 
find themselves incurring unprecedented expenses to meet the needs of record numbers 
of asylum claimants within their own borders. Martin (1991:37) thinks that the political 
will to provide the needed funding has been sapped, in part, by the expenses resulting 
from their ineffective asylum systems. According to Bill Frelick of the United States 
Committee for Refugees (USCR) a new paradigm is emerging by which refugee flows are 
prevented before asylum seekers cross an international border. It is concerned with the 
need to contain the problem within states. Thus the idea to create distinct spaces in 
which displaced people can be accommodated (Chimni 2000a:440). 
The idea of a safety zone or a safe heaven is in theory a simple one. It is an area 
within a country to which IDPs (and prospective refugees) can flee to secure assistance 
and protection. Chimni (2000a:398) distinguishes between three kinds of safe havens: 
Firstly, there can be a safe haven outside of the country from which individuals flee, a 
territory in a third country under the protection of an external power or the UN. The 
second involves the establishment of a large self-administrated and economically viable 
internationally protected zone within the country whose citizens are at risk. And the 
third entails the establishment, also within the country whose citizens are at risk, of 
internationally protected safe havens whose populations are dependent on external 
support for their basic necessities. The first kind of safe haven or safety zone is the kind 
that the United States established in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for Haitian refugees 
interdicted on the high seas. The second type of safe haven was created in Iraq for the 
Kurds. And the last kind of safe havens were established in Bosnia (Ibid.). 
In 1995, Chimni (2000a:440) expresses a critical view on the safety zone, but does 
offer reasons for not dismissing the concept. He argues that spatial practices are socially 
constructed and are implicated in power. The absence of innocent space can only be 
grasped if we understand that spatial practices cannot be assigned meaning 
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independently of the material or social processes which produce them. New spatial 
categories, like the concept of ‘safety zones’, must therefore necessarily be deconstructed 
in the matrix of changing configurations of material and social processes. The growing 
concern with ‘internal asylum’ (for example, through establishing safety zones for the 
internally displaced) as opposed to ‘external asylum’ (refugee status) has, in other words, 
to be grounded in contemporary realities.  
The question however remains whether the UN Security Council, the only UN 
institution which could have such power, would create a safety zone without the consent 
of the state concerned. Concerning the safety zone established in Northern Iraq this was 
done, despite countries such as Zimbabwe and Cuba voting against Security Council 
Resolution 688. However, on 20 December 1991, the General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 46/182 which elaborates the principles which must be applied in the case of 
humanitarian assistance: The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states 
must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this 
context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected 
country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country (Ibid:445). In 
other words, the Security Council appears to have exceeded its authority in passing 
Resolution 688, and without doubt in establishing and organising the coercive defence of 
safety zones in Iraq without its consent. Can the Security Council also exceed its 
authority in the case of protecting the IDPs? Lessons learned from cases of safety zones 
are that the need to protect safe areas will not be seriously considered in the absence of 
geopolitical and commercial interest. International involvement is unlikely without a 
hidden geopolitical or commercial agenda. An example is Iraq, peaking at almost a 
million people internally displaced, as a result of the military intervention in March 2003 
(Global IDP Project 2003c). Trying to legitimate a military intervention, the allies; the 
United States, Britain and Spain provide disputed arguments for attacking Iraq. Even 
though human suffering is mentioned as one of them, most likely geopolitical and 
commercial interest also constitute reasons for an international intervention. 
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3.7 Is a Safety Zone Safe? 
The case of a safety zone in Bosnia raises the question as to whether a state has the 
right to prevent people from fleeing persecution even when the objective is the survival 
of the state itself. Those concerned with negative implications of the principle of 
sovereignty, and committed to the cause of human rights do not seem to have paid any 
attention to this consequence. A successful safety zone fell through because the Western 
powers were not willing to commit the necessary resources to protect. Since states were 
only interested in stopping the flow of refugees from former Yugoslavia the only way 
out was to create safety zones inside the country. The fall of Srebrenica in Bosnia 
exemplifies the dangers of a fashionable human rights policy when it is decreed by states 
unwilling to lose a single life in its enforcement. Men living in the safety zone Srebrenica 
were caught in a human rights death trap, sacrificed to the good intentions of cowardly 
countries (Robertson 2000:74-75). As a result of the failure to protect people in 
Srebrenica, Chimni in 1995 writes that the equation that establishing safety zones is 
similar to collusion with genocide is justified (Chimni 2000a:452). The concept of a 
safety zone offers an excellent example of how language can constitute our practices. By 
calling the particular space a ‘safety zone’, despite its contrary nature, it contrives to 
remove all other spaces, genuinely safer, from view. If the UN is to protect a safety zone, 
it should have a clear idea of whom they are protecting them from, and treat these 
aggressors as the enemy. But instead, attention has been riveted on a predefined space. 
We are dealing here with a new architecture of control which is being constructed in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. In fact, it defines the new field of institutional life. The body 
of the oppressed, the refugee, is coming to be enmeshed in an international division of 
labour in which only goods, capital, and services are permitted mobility (Ibid.).  
Yet, disturbing as the concept of a safety zone is, should it be rejected out of hand? 
According to Weiner and Münz (1997:40), the failure of safe havens, as the one in 
Srebrenica, should not be regarded as evidence that they cannot work. In a cynical world 
moral judgements do not necessarily translate into practical intervention. When the 
world is as unjust as it is today, the victims of the international system (in this case the 
host countries) themselves often end up seeking answers in responses proposed by 
hegemonic powers for their own reasons. Thus it is that even some developing countries 
find the concept of a safety zone attractive. On the one hand, there are the poorest of 
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countries which are faced with mass influx of refugees and cannot cope with it. In their 
case the very misery of the world that they inhabit is conspiring to break the bonds of 
solidarity with the more immediate victims of the unequal international system. On the 
other hand, there are the affluent countries which advance the concept in order to 
eliminate the need for burden sharing at the level of asylum, in this way hoping to 
protect unbelievable privileges. Chimni argues that only in the former instance should 
the idea of creating a safety zone be considered with sympathy (Chimni 2000a:456-57). 
3.8 Prevention Rather than Protection 
From ignoring the role and responsibility of the country of origin in the prevention 
of refugee problems or in creating conditions to promote return, the end of the Cold 
War opened up the possibility of direct engagement with human rights law as a means of 
implementing the policy of preventive protection, on the one hand, and to promote 
return, on the other. The changed perspective has yielded an inclusive concept of 
protection that increasingly does not distinguish between different legal categories of 
persons (Chimni 2000b:253-254). In 1994, UNHCR wrote that for the international 
community as a whole, there are clear advantages in adopting a global approach to 
situations of coerced displacement, actual or potential. The measures necessary to solve a 
refugee problem through voluntary repatriation are the same as those required to relieve 
the plight of the internally displaced and of those at risk of displacement; and preventing 
internal displacement by removing the factors that force people to flee their homes will 
also remove the immediate cause of refugee flows. By recognising that the problems of 
the internally displaced and of refugees are manifestations of the same phenomenon of 
coerced displacement, UNHCR has increasingly considered activities on behalf of the 
internally displaced to be indispensable components of an overall strategy of prevention 
and solutions. In Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the countries of former 
Yugoslavia, the Horn and Central Africa, Liberia, Mozambique, and Central America, to 
cite some current examples of UNHCR involvement with the internally displaced, the 
link between internal and external displacement is obvious and the need to address the 
internal situation in order to satisfactorily resolve the external refugee problem seems 
equally clear (Chimni 2000a:434- 435).  
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Goodwin-Gill (1999:246) claims that future protection seems to be fading rapidly 
from the refugee agenda. UNHCR’s embracement of ‘humanitarian action’ and the 
willing endorsement of this move by many states have compromised the agency’s 
mandate responsibility: it is no longer identified primarily as a protection agency, but 
rather as an assistance provider. However, when UNHCR tends to IDPs and provides 
assistance - not protection, the result is that it may be accused of failing to speak out on 
protection matters for fear of jeopardising its assistance capacity (Cohen and Deng 
1998). It is as necessary to ensure that the international response is not dominated by the 
‘dead hand’ of the legalist, as it is to maintain consistency and adherence to principle. A 
culture of protection is thus not just lawyers’ business; on the contrary, while it supposes 
recognition of an international legal context and a commitment to the principles of the 
UNHCR Statute, protection is and ought to be the business of everyone.  
Preventing internal displacement by removing the factors that force people to flee 
their homes will also remove the immediate cause of refugee flows. Prevention and 
assistance is and will be important in the future. However, part of a prevention strategy 
should also be protection. Many get displaced several times. If they were provided with 
the protection they needed, it would prevent them from fleeing several times.  
3.9 UNHCR -Still Apolitical? 
One debate within the UNHCR is whether it can maintain its humanitarian and 
apolitical stance given its growing involvement in the affairs of refugee-producing 
countries. Its humanitarian and non-political character has prohibited it from becoming 
too intrusive (Barnett 2001:258). During the Cold War, UN organisations routinely 
presented themselves as ‘apolitical’ and ‘humanitarian’ to signalise to states that they 
understood their place and recognised sovereignty’s canon of non-interference. As the 
tasks of UNHCR are being redefined in the matrix of the policy of containment and the 
accompanying language of security, the ‘non-political and humanitarian’ clause in its 
mandate is being diluted (Chimni 2000b:256).  
Originally, the UNHCR framework is specifically embodied to be of a non-political 
nature. But in the realm of IDP protection, the UNHCR is often in direct conflict with 
government entities. Regarding the limitations of the humanitarian actions undertaken 
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by humanitarian and civil organisations that raised the issue of whether more assertive 
forms of action and interventions are required, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Sadako Ogata, remarked in 1997;  
“Enforcement is a critical issue. It may complicate the arduous efforts of conflict 
mediators. It may undermine neutrality and engender risks for impartial humanitarian 
action. But are strict neutrality and effective protection not often incompatible? 
Humanitarian responses should serve first of all protection of people” (Chakma 
2000:230).  
In 1991, UNHCR’s Working Group on International Protection considered 
whether it could maintain its apolitical credentials alongside its growing involvement in 
the refugee-producing countries. It offered four observations and conclusions. First,  
“the evolution of UNHCR's role over the last forty years has demonstrated that the 
mandate is resilient enough to allow, or indeed require, adaptation by UNHCR to 
new, unprecedented challenges through new approaches, including in the areas of 
prevention and in-country protection” (Barnett 2001:258). 
Refugee rights, the document noted, are part and parcel of human rights; thus, 
UNHCR’s role as protector of refugee law legitimizes its growing concern for the 
violations of human rights that lead to refugee flows. Second, “UNHCR's humanitarian 
expertise and experience have been recognised by the General Assembly as an appropriate basis for 
undertaking a range of activities not normally viewed as being within the Office's mandate”. Third, “the 
High Commissioner's non-political mandate requires neutrality;” but “neutrality must be coupled with a 
thorough understanding of prevailing political and other realities”. Fourth, whereas once 
humanitarianism meant avoiding the political circumstances within the home country 
and honouring the principle of non-interference, it soon began to include aspects of the 
state’s internal affairs. UNHCR noted that it was not violating state sovereignty because 
it was operating with the consent of the state (except in those circumstances where there 
was no state to give consent), but there was little doubt that what was permissible under 
the humanitarian label has significantly expanded (Barnett 2001:258-259). 
If neutrality results in negative responsibility, it becomes problematic to justify when 
crimes are committed against human beings. As such UNHCR faces formidable 
challenges if claiming to be apolitical, meaning the doctrine of ‘negative responsibility’, 
namely, the idea that we are as much responsible for what we do, as for what we do not 
do. Displacement crises are not generally predictable, as to timing, size, needs or 
duration. Transposed to the institutional context, negative state responsibility can be 
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seen to have led UNHCR to embrace every humanitarian operation remotely connected 
to the issue of displacement, in a vain effort to remedy wrongs that do or might give rise 
to flight. Given the complexity of causes, however, not to mention their political 
dimensions and the finite resources available, such engagements are doomed to failure. 
To accuse the UNHCR for being responsible for not doing anything, is ultimately 
unproductive. For example, during the war in Bosnia 1992-1995, the UN was criticised 
for being impartial and not taking sides for justice and law to occur. The ‘general lack of 
political will’ that is so frequently castigated by the High Commissioner for Refugees and 
others, becomes simply the lack of no one’s will (Goodwin-Gill 1999:241). Plattner in 
Paul (2000) argue if that impartiality and neutrality are compromised, an ongoing 
humanitarian operation should be reconsidered, scaled down or terminated. Then again, 
in intra-state conflicts impartiality has often failed to restore peace and, in some cases 
such as Bosnia, may have actually prolonged suffering. Is the conclusion then, that being 
neutral and impartial is not enough? A crime against humanity creates a moral 
responsibility. It is important to consider neutrality also as taking side. Neither inaction 
nor neutrality can be justified in the face of egregious crimes as massacre of innocent 
people. Taking no action assists only the perpetrators. Neutrality and impartiality should 
not be interpreted to mean passivity in the face of violence. In fact, neutrality and 
impartiality demand strong action on the behalf of victims, but on behalf of victims 
regardless of whatever side they are on (Paul 2000). UNHCR’s statutory responsibilities 
impose important legal constraints on its own freedom of action; another is that 
‘political will’ is as much the business of states, as it is of those organisations which states 
have created to fulfil particular political purposes (Goodwin-Gill 1999:241). 
The political realities being what they are, UNHCR has only limited capacity to 
influence outcomes or to ensure that states fulfil their international obligations. Apart 
from a small percentage of administrative costs met from the budget of the General 
Assembly, UNHCR is entirely dependent on voluntary contributions, and even if not 
earmarked for specific operations, donations frequently come with the baggage of the 
donors’ agenda (Ibid:244), which again affect their work. As in the case, for instance, of 
members of the UN’s donor governments who donated an average of $ 207 per person 
towards the 1999 Kosovo/Yugoslav UN Appeal while an average of $ 16 per person 
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was rendered towards the UN Appeal for Sierra Leone. Life in one country clearly held 
greater value for donor governments than life in the other (Camilleri 2003).  
It has become more difficult for UNHCR to maintain its apolitical standing given its 
growing involvement within refugee-producing states, and UNHCR has become more 
political in the sense that one of the main objectives today is to promote and support an 
effective state in response to internal displacement, with direct contact with the 
government as a result. But UNHCR’s role as protector of refugee law legitimates its 
growing concern for the violations of human rights that lead to displacement. 
3.10 In-Country Protection: Out of Bounds for UNHCR?  
UNHCR has considerable skills and experience in the international protection of 
refugees, but these may not be automatically transferred to the internally displaced. 
UNHCR has no legal authority to ‘protect’ persons within their own country; there is no 
treaty, no customary international law, and no locus standi (Goodwin-Gill 1999:246). 
However, the combination of state pressures and the normative principle of popular 
sovereignty enable a more political and pragmatic UNHCR to widen its activities under 
the humanitarian banner and to become more deeply involved within countries (Barnett 
2001). Still, so far as UNHCR purports to ‘protect’ IDPs or even returnees, it must 
necessarily rely on consensual arrangements outside the rule of law, depending on states’ 
will. The timely identification of an agency generally competent to work on behalf of 
IDPs (such as the Office of the Co-ordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, or the 
International Committee of the Red Cross) will likely be one other crucial factor trying 
to assist UNHCR’s mandate. This is not to say that the IDPs have no call on the 
international community; only that this should not be met at the price of the 
international protection of refugees. After all, there is enough to be done there 
(Goodwin-Gill 1999 and 2000).  
Goodwin Gill (1999:246) sees an in-country presence on behalf of IDPs as 
potentially incompatible with UNHCR’s primary responsibility to provide international 
protection to refugees, that is, to those who have fled their country. The relief that may 
be due in such politicised and conflict-ridden situations should be left to those 
organisations better able to maintain independence, neutrality and impartiality. Although, 
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UNHCR’s mandate to provide protection and solutions for refugees has not changed 
over the last 50 years, its involvement with the IDPs has grown considerably. But 
UNHCR has a possible conflict of interest and the extent to which UNHCR is called 
upon to assume further responsibilities in relation to the internally displaced will be a key 
issue in the future development of the organisation (UNHCR 2000).  
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2000), UNHCR should continue to 
disseminate the Guiding Principles and should encourage governments to abide by them; 
UNHCR should strengthen its advocacy on behalf of IDPs, including in those countries 
where it is not directly involved in providing assistance and protection. In particular, 
UNHCR should more forcefully condemn violations against IDPs if they occur, and 
UNHCR should ensure that its involvement with IDPs does not undermine refugee 
protection principles, in particular the right of all individuals to leave their country and 
seek asylum. Growing involvement in in-country protection might discourage individuals 
from fleeing and thus exercising their right to seek asylum (Barnett 2001). Concepts such 
as preventive protection and internal flight alternatives are essentially designed to 
discourage flight and to bring safety to people rather than people to safety. This can be 
defended in the sense that they represent pragmatic responses to an environment that 
increasingly forced UNHCR to choose between the “least bad” of alternatives, but they 
also can have the effect of discouraging flight because they are intended to provide an 
alternative to exit (Ibid:265). A consequence of a UNHCR in-country protection, is that 
they actively are trying to improve the domestic political situation, a tendency reinforced 
by the knowledge that relief can be provided to those still within their country. The 
result, as Gilbert express it in Barnett (2001:266) is that UNHCR might find itself 
compromising its protection role as it provides in-country assistance and delivers 
humanitarian aid; principles yield to pragmatism and political expediency. Though 
according to Mooney (1999:216) UNHCR might still be able to provide in-country 
protection without necessarily sacrificing refugee rights. 
In the early 1990s, there was an increased emphasis on an international presence in 
countries of origin in order to encourage people to remain and international assistance to 
the internally displaced, wherever this could have ‘a preventive impact’; that is, not just 
humanitarian relief, but relief with a purpose. UNHCR was consequently positioned to 
try to fill this need, but as if it had no other role, no pre-existing mandate, just a blank 
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slate on which to write out its new purpose. The circumstances were propitious, 
however, as developments in a variety of contexts reveal (Goodwin-Gill 1999:225-226). 
But any whisper that UNHCR should take on the mandate for IDPs was quickly and 
roundly muzzled by a very large majority of UNHCR officials who worried about 
becoming more entangled with domestic politics, diluting their protection mandate, and 
giving states another opportunity to backtrack from refugee rights, and of state officials 
who balked at sanctioning an open-ended commitment that threatened state sovereignty 
(Barnett 2001).  
In-country protection may not be out of bonds for UNHCR. However, it must rely 
on consensual arrangements with the refugee-producing state to be present within a 
country. As long as UNHCR manages the balance between prevention and protection, 
not discouraging the right to seek asylum, in-country protection should be an alternative. 
3.11 Former Yugoslavia –a Pilot Project of In-Country Protection 
The turning point of UNHCR protecting IDPs came with the Gulf and Yugoslavian 
Wars, where both the Kurdish population and people in Yugoslavia were denied the exit 
option (Barnett 2001:267). The Former Yugoslavia was something of a pilot project, in 
which UNHCR’s strategy was directed away from protection of refugees strictly so-
called, to the more idealistic political goal of preventive solutions. From this, UNHCR 
was provided many lessons regarding working within a state, including the dilemma 
between prevention and protection. 
In his letter of 14 November 1991, the then UN Secretary-General, Javier Péres de 
Cuéllar, invited the High Commissioner for Refugees to become more closely involved 
with events in the Former Yugoslavia “to assist in bringing relief to needy internally displaced 
persons affected by the conflict…[which]…involvement…may also have a welcome preventive impact in 
helping to avoid the further displacement of population”. It was this operation, in particular, that 
inspired that notion of humanitarian action which, it was said, could be seen in 
UNHCR’s “initiatives to provide protection and assistance to displaced populations within countries of 
origin”, where ‘pre-emptive assistance’ would serve as a tool for preventive protection, 
although it was stressed that prevention was not a substitute for asylum (Goodwin-Gill 
1999:226). However, since several regions were on the verge of declaring independence, 
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the counter argument was that today’s internally displaced would be tomorrow’s refugees 
and as a practical matter should be helped immediately (Wilkinson 1999). 
The Former Yugoslavia provided many lessons and illustrations of political and 
humanitarian failures. UNHCR’s humanitarian mandate was negatively manipulated. 
Given its specific humanitarian and non-political role, as well as its independent 
responsibility to provide international protection to refugees, the attribution to, or 
assumption by, UNHCR of a ‘lead agency’ role was incompatible with its mandate in any 
situation having serious political content, such as mediation or conflict resolution. 
UNHCR was not only obliged to negotiate away substantial quantities of relief aid as the 
price for access, but was also caught between the devil and the deep blue sea in the 
politics and practice of ethnic cleansing and evacuation. When facilitating the transit of 
persons leaving Bosnia, for example, UNHCR appeared tacitly to endorse ‘organised 
flight’ and to be a party to restrictions on spontaneous movement in search of refuge. 
This was obviously not intended, but it was nonetheless a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the politics of prevention and assistance to populations at risk 
(Goodwin-Gill 1999:226-227).  
Moreover, UNHCR’s response to the Secretary-General’s invitation to engage in 
operations not clearly within its mandate confused established lines of authority. The 
problems faced by UNHCR were due not only to the complexities of the situation, but 
also to the fact that the terms of its engagement in the Former Yugoslavia were not 
clearly laid down in advance. Although the situation was quite unlike any in which it had 
been involved, some see the choice of UNHCR as ‘logical’, at least so far as it was driven 
by recognition of the agency’s recognised logistical capacity. At the same time, however, 
its lead agency status “propelled it into a policy vacuum and detracted from its primary role as 
a…body for protecting and assisting…refugees”. The relationship between ‘preventive 
protection’ and asylum was never worked out in this strategy, either theoretically or on 
the ground. If effective protection generally requires being there, ‘merely being there’ is 
never the sufficient condition for protection (Ibid:228). As Erin Mooney writes in 
‘Presence ergo Protection?’ (1995:430): “Given that a concern for physical safety is the primary 
impetus for flight, the protective effects which High Commissioner attributes to assistance are minimal”. 
But the possibility of designated lead agencies to co-ordinate complex emergencies still 
remains. 
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The UNHCR’s involvement in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia from the early 
stages of war often placed UNHCR in a precarious position. UNHCR was portrayed as 
being irrelevant in Europe and the former Soviet Union, but through the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata innovative emergency procedures, UNHCR 
earned a newfound respect within and outside the UN arena. Various donor countries, 
primarily European, whose shores and borders were facing overwhelming numbers of 
asylum-seekers from former Eastern bloc nations, “pushed UNHCR to help stem the 
haemorrhage of refugees on the continent”, and thus quickly supplemented its budget. The 
UNHCR’s assignment for supporting IDP populations did not always stem from a 
purely humanitarian angle. UNHCR was utilised as a political tool to encourage 
containment (refugee prevention). It becomes evident that donor countries, anxious on 
the question of prevention, are not as apprehensive about post-conflict restoration as 
they are on alleviating refugees/asylum-seekers from their territory during the points of 
crisis. They do not seriously consider that lack of development opportunities will 
stagnate the return process for both refugees and IDPs, and even possibly ignite another 
war (Camilleri 2003).  
3.12 The ‘If…Why Not’ Argument  
Reality suggests that humanitarian responses to the protection of IDPs are often 
guided by geo-political considerations. Among the many objections, one is particularly 
cogent; it is the ‘if…why not’ argument (Fixdal and Smith 1998:294). If Kosovo, why 
not Sudan? In many cases the plight and sufferings of small groups of IDPs remain 
unattended or forgotten (Chakma 2000:231). Three of the world’s most protracted, 
vicious crises in Sudan, Angola and Colombia are largely internal conflicts with together 
over nine million IDPs, and as such are often ignored by the world’s audience compared 
with, say, Kosovo. Why did the international community intervene in Former 
Yugoslavia, and not in other war-torn countries?  
President Clinton justified a bombing attack on a sovereign state with “We could not 
stand aside and let history forget the Kosovo Albanians […] Because of our resolve, the twentieth 
century is ending not with helpless indignation, but with hopeful affirmation of human dignity and 
human rights for the twentieth century”. But human dignity, the assumption upon which the 
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Universal Declaration was built, was not much in evidence in places like Colombia or the 
Congo (Robertson 2000:444-445). 
In the course of the NATO bombing of Former Yugoslavia, former US President 
Carter in 1999 wrote: “Formal commitments are being made in the Balkans, where white Europeans 
are involved, but no such concerted efforts are being made by leaders outside of Africa to resolve the 
disputes under way there. This failure gives the impression of racism” (Chimni 2000b:249). This 
type of selectivity undermines the claims that the motivation driving is purely human and 
non-political. This issue is ethical to begin with, potentially legal if efforts are made to 
codify the action into international law, and directly political, strategic and operational. 
In Fixdal and Smith (1998:301), the Secretary-General of the UN made the following 
statement in Sarajevo in 1992: “You have a situation [here] which is better than ten other places all 
over the world”. And as Stephen John Stedman observed: “if humanitarian concerns –measured 
by death and genocide campaigns –where the justification of military intervention, Bosnia would rank 
below Sudan, Liberia and East Timor” (Ibid.). 
Many have argued that the reason why states themselves will not help protecting the 
IDPs, is not only because of their sovereignty, but also for geographic reasons. Does 
distance matter from the moral point of view? Wilfully allowing someone to die when 
you could easily help them seems callous and blameworthy, irrespective of whether the 
victim of indifference is close at hand or in a distant country. However, there are also 
intuitions that seem to pull in the other direction. Partiality, any special concern for those 
who are emotionally and geographically close to us, seems the most natural and morally 
appropriate of impulses (Cottingham 2000:309-310). Former Yugoslavia may be an 
example of the latter. Indeed, the international community’s preference for some large-
scale tragedies over others leads some commentators, as Jeffrey Clark in Fixdal and 
Smith (1998:301) to suggest that there are important weaknesses in the UN system. The 
1990s record of inconsistency and selectivity should lead us to address the difficult 
problems of priorities, of the relative scale of different tragedies, and of the comparative 
importance of solving the dilemmas that give rise to war. The UN Security Council and 
the great powers do not have the resources to do everything: on what basis will they 
decide which of the several pressing problems to confront? How high up on the agenda 
is the plight of the IDPs? 
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3.13 Conclusion 
State sovereignty has shaped the character of refugee law and the establishment of 
UNHCR. After the end of the Cold War a new refugee regime has developed. The 
dynamics of displacement have changed greatly, so too has the international response 
and the character of UNHCR. UNHCR’s working definition of humanitarianism 
includes the principle of non-interference. However, the combination of state pressures 
and the normative principle of popular sovereignty have enabled the UNHCR to be 
more political and pragmatic and widen its activities under the refugee-producing 
country. But the extent to which UNHCR wants to find itself attempting to save failed 
states is a matter of debate.  
Initially set up as a temporary institution, UNHCR was essentially intended to wrap 
up the refugee problems remaining after the Second World War. This has clearly 
influenced its personality and practices. Its work is intended, indeed required, to be 
humanitarian, social and non-political, but it clearly takes place in a political context, 
frequently characterised by tension between sovereignty and international responsibility. 
But as with state sovereignty and popular sovereignty, UNHCR tries to establish 
harmony between the security concern of states and the protection needs of displaced 
people. The increasing legitimating principle of popular sovereignty, has expanded 
UNHCR’s humanitarian space, while others argue that motivation for intervening often 
is political, strategic and operational. This may be an evidence of important weaknesses 
within the UN system. Deciding which of the several pressing problems to confront is 
often a question of priority, and such decisions seem to be taken on a questionable basis. 
UNHCR has been aware of the emergence of more restrictive and hostile attitudes 
towards refugees in the post-Cold War period. As part of a myriad developments in 
international politics, the international refugee regime cannot be immune from change 
and these restrictive asylum measures do affect the work of UNHCR. Also, the prospect 
of conflict spilling over international borders mean that violations of human rights and 
internal conflicts have an impact on regional and international security. This gives 
UNHCR a reason to be more involved within states. If not willing to receive asylum-
seekers, effort should be transferred to strengthen the protection of IDPs within 
countries, instead of just leaving it to a rejection at the borders. Some applaud and 
encourage UNHCR for addressing humanitarian needs including IDPs, others accuse 
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UNHCR of undermining the institution of asylum without being able to ensure effective 
protection within borders. However, UNHCR’s primary focus has shifted from 
providing international protection for refugees towards large-scale humanitarian 
operations in the midst of the conflict, for war-affected populations. UNHCR role as 
protector of refugee law legitimates its growing concern for the violations of human 
rights that lead to refugee flows. And if operating with the consent of the state, UNHCR 
is not violating state sovereignty. However, where the consent of the state is absent, 
UNHCR has only limited capacity to influence outcomes or to ensure that states fulfil 
their obligations, political realities being what they are. 
Is in-country protection out of bounds for the UNHCR? UNHCR has no legal 
authority to protect persons within their own country. While there are arguments for 
protecting IDPs, others find it incompatible with the primary responsibility to provide 
international protection to refugees. There are many obstacles for UNHCR to protect 
IDPs, such as state sovereignty, possible political involvement, a dilution of their 
protection mandate, the dilemma between prevention and protection and asylum, the 
danger of becoming a substitute for state responsibility, lack of resources and security 
concerns. These are all very important considerations. But are these obstacles enough to 
maintain a protection gap when crimes against humanity are committed? Clearly, as the 
case of Former Yugoslavia shows, it is necessary to establish lines of authority and 
guiding principles before getting involved within a country. Reasons for UNHCR’s 
engagement within a refugee-producing country need to be laid down in advance, if not 
UNHCR risks ending up in a political vacuum, like the IDPs themselves.  
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4.  Need for an International IDP Legislation? 
4.1 Introduction 
The rights of refugees are spelled out in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, and 
UNHCR is the principal guardian of the Convention. But despite the principle of 
sovereignty, protection and assistance to people fleeing happens more and more within 
the areas in conflict. This has put forward new claims towards the international refugee 
law. One hundred and thirty-seven states have subscribed to the ideal of international 
protection in its treaty-based formulation, as represented by the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. By way of these two instruments, 
states have accepted a range of fundamental obligations as crucial for protection as they 
are for assistance and solutions. Among them are a near universal consensus on the 
refugee definition5 and acceptance of the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, the 
obligations states have not to return a refugee to a territory where his or her life or 
freedom may be endangered (Goodwin-Gill 1999:221). But as the pattern of global 
migration changed where increased numbers of people are fleeing within their own 
country, the relevance of the 1951 Refugee Convention has been called into question, 
especially in Europe, ironically its very birthplace (UNHCR 2003e). 
The 1967 Protocol expanded the scope of the Convention and removed the 
geographical and time limitations written into the original Convention under which 
mainly Europeans involved in events occurring before 1 January 1951, could apply for 
refugee status. But still, one challenge for the international community is the strict 
insistence of territorial criterion6 in the Law of Refugee Status. According to Hathaway 
(1991:29), this has prompted concern that there is a mismatch between the definition 
                                              
5 Article 1 –Definition of the term “refugee” in 1951 UN Refugee Convention: “A (2) [Any person who]…owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence…is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it…”( UNHCR 2000). 
6 This meaning that you have to cross an international border to be entitled to international legal protection and 
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and the actual human suffering related to involuntary migration. There is nothing 
intuitively obvious about this requirement, many if not most of the persons forced to 
flee their homes in search of safety, remain within the boundaries of their state. Their 
plight may be every bit as serious as that of individuals who cross borders, yet the 
Convention definition of refugee status excludes the internally displaced from the scope 
of global protection.  
In 1994, in a report by the Representative of the Secretary-General, Francis Deng, 
to the Commission on Human Rights, he writes that many important principles can be 
drawn by analogy from refugee law for the protection of IDPs. For instance, the 
articulation of a right not to be forcibly returned to areas where the life or freedom of 
the displaced persons could be threatened is vital in some cases. Other similar rights 
could include the right to seek residence in a safe place, the right to be provided with 
adequate documentation, the right not to be identified as a displaced person if that 
would result in discrimination, the freedom of movement especially in and out of the 
camp or other shelter for the displaced, the right to benefit from measures towards 
family reunification and the right to voluntary return to the original area of residence 
(Chimni 2000a:404).  
The question is whether the Convention still is relevant for the new millennium. 
There are now about twice as many IDPs as refugees. Since the root causes of their 
displacement are the same -human rights abuses, civil strife, and generalized violence -
this global displacement of more than 25 million people inevitably calls into question the 
soundness of a definition of refugees that continues to exclude two-thirds of them (Lee 
2001:456). Though the nature of conflict and migration patterns have changed in the 
intervening decades, the Convention has proven resilient in helping to protect an 
estimated 50 million people in all types of situations. As long as persecution of 
individuals and groups persists, there will be a need for the Convention. But with the 
change of nature in most conflicts, the numbers of IDPs have increased and there is 
definitively a need for a widespread international debate on how this group of uprooted 
people can be better protected and by whom. The right of IDPs to international 
protection and assistance, hitherto constrained by the concept of sovereignty, must be 
invigorated by human rights law and increasing resort to Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter (Ibid:457). 
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IDPs often face a much more difficult and hazardous future. Their principal source 
of legal protection and material assistance is their own government which may, in fact, 
view the displaced as “the enemy” or “enemy sympathizers” in a civil conflict and which 
may be in no position anyway to offer emergency food, medicine or shelter. Since 
sovereignty has, until recently been sacrosanct, outside donors have been more likely to 
support refugee crises rather than victims of internal displacement. And though it is now 
generally agreed that general human rights law applies to all displaced persons, 
international protection is still more difficult to enforce for the internally uprooted than 
for refugees (Wilkinson 1999).  
In this chapter, I will address the question as to whether a new international legal 
framework is needed regarding the IDPs, presently excluded from the scope of global 
protection. I will end the chapter with an overview of approaches set forward by the 
international community trying to fill the protection gap, and discuss whether they are 
adequate to bridge the protection gap in international law.  
4.2 Need for a Separate Legal Framework? 
In recent years it has often been argued that the international community should 
adopt a convention protecting IDPs, along the lines of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Some people believe that existing international human rights law is adequate, others 
argue that there are big gaps. However, admitting that there are gaps may be seen as 
offering a hiding place, so the government cannot be held responsible for breaking 
human rights towards the IDPs. While others argue that the same gap will bring 
attention to the problems raised by IDPs and will provide an opportunity to develop a 
clear protection strategy for the IDPs.  
The scholarly opinion is divided on the need for evolving a specific legal framework 
to meet the assistance and protection needs of IDPs. There are three main schools of 
thought. One school of thought contends that the existing regime of international 
human rights and humanitarian laws offers a firm basis to enforce the accountability of 
states. Indeed, it argues that any attempt to produce a separate legal regime for IDPs 
could undercut the extensive legal framework, which already exists. A second school of 
thought believes that there is a need for a definitive legal statement of the principles and 
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norms applicable to IDPs (Chimni 2000a: 391). Francis Deng, the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs and Roberta Cohen are among those who 
respectively argue that a specific framework would be more helpful. Arguments against a 
new legal instrument come mainly from those who believe in placing emphasis on 
implementing existing norms rather than creating new ones. The ICRC, in particular, has 
expressed the fear that any attempt to develop new standards could risk undercutting the 
extensive coverage that already exists under the Geneva Conventions. They believe that 
rather than undermining existing protection a new instrument would both reconfirm and 
expand coverage for a group of persons insufficiently protected at present. Drafting a 
non-binding declaration would be an incremental step toward establishing minimum 
conditions for the treatment of the displaced (Cohen 1996:24-25). 
Bugnion (2001:22-23) is among those who think a new legal statement on the 
protection of IDPs will weaken the existing legal framework. The Convention of 1951 
was essential for the protection of refugees because international humanitarian law did 
not apply on the territory of neutral or non-belligerent states. IDPs uprooted by armed 
conflict –whether international or non-international –are protected by international 
humanitarian law, according to Bugnion. Any new treaty on the protection of IDPs 
would therefore be a source of confusion and might weaken existing provisions. There is 
no guarantee that any new codification would provide a higher standard of protection 
than the rules already in force. Nor is there any guarantee that a new treaty would be 
quickly ratified. Bugnion emphasises that refugees and displaced persons are first and 
foremost civilian victims of war; as such they are protected by international humanitarian 
law before, during and after displacement. 
According to Hathaway (1991:33) three factors dictated the exclusion of the 
internally displaced from the 1951 Refugee Convention; limited resources, concern 
about state participation and respect for sovereignty. It was also a reflection of the 
limited reach of international law. In other words, the purpose of the Convention was 
not to divide involuntary migrants into those who are worthy of assistance and those 
who are not deserving, but was instead to define the scope of refugee law in a realistic, 
workable way. Further, he writes that in one sense, the exclusion of the internally 
displaced is clearly unfair, it does not recognise the existence of social, legal and 
economic barriers which make it impossible for all to escape to international protection 
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(Hathaway 1991:29). Also, Martin (1991:48-49) admits that internal conflicts poses more 
complex issues, depending on the extent and intensity of the fighting, the civilians’ 
greatest need is often relocation. But they do not fit within the Convention, and Martin 
compares them with victims of socio-economic rights violations or of natural disasters 
(Martin 1991:40). 
According to Fixdal and Smith in Reichberg and Syse (2002), the focus of 
international lawyers has tended to be narrowly legalistic. In a report to the Commission 
on Human Rights in 1994, Deng writes that controversy still prevails among lawyers as 
to the scope and applicability of existing legal doctrine. There are those who believe that 
the main challenge is one of implementation. The proponents of this view believe that to 
hold otherwise would be to put into question the legal foundation for accountability. In 
contrast, there are those who maintain that legal reform is necessary to ensure complete 
and adequate coverage. While both points of view emanate from the need to strengthen 
protection, the second implies, according to Deng, that setting new standards would not 
only fill any existing gaps but would also focus international attention and thereby raise 
the level of public awareness of the problem and the need for solution (Chimni 
2000a:401-402). But today’s conflicts will not and cannot be solved by international law 
alone. According to Robinson (1999), the first need today is not to write new laws, but 
to implement what already exists in the field, close to the victims. It is important to 
notice that a rule is one of law not because it has been laid down with clarity in a treaty 
or a textbook, but because there is at least a slim prospect that some day someone will 
be arrested for its breach. A significant impact can be achieved by agents and 
organizations through a concerted approach towards a common cause by monitoring the 
implementation of international law. 
Hathaway (1997:82) argues that the 1951 Refugee Convention is not a means of 
punishing “bad” states that choose to inflict serious harm on their citizens. Refugee law 
is rather about the protection of people who have no ability to access national 
protection. But if refugee law is about the protection of people who have no ability to 
access national protection, IDPs living in a state that lacks political will and capacity to 
provide protection, should be able to look somewhere for protection. Hathaway 
(1997:79) continues by saying the key challenges to the value of the Convention refugee 
definition are that it fails to recognise the claims of persons whose predicaments do not 
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resemble those of the post-Second World War ideological emigrés; that it is insufficiently 
attentive to dilemmas that result from the failure of the states and that its alienating 
criterion inappropriately excludes the claims of the internally displaced. Still, he believes 
that the Convention remains of significant ethical value. The IDPs, who in his view are 
more logically seen as part and parcel of the broader class of human rights victims within 
states, clearly have a strong moral claim to protection. But there are increasing 
opportunities for the international community to intervene in states to stop the harm, or 
at least facilitate remedies outside the state that ultimately pressure governments to desist 
from human rights abuses. It remains the case, however, that the protective capacities of 
international human rights law can very often be frustrated by claims of the sovereign 
authority of a state to govern the welfare of its own citizens. Sovereign frontiers often 
force the international community to accept less than fully adequate solutions to the 
needs of the internally displaced. From the point of view of Hathaway’s (1997:88) the 
net result of advocating a merged regime to address the plight of what are, legally and 
logistically, two distinct groups of persons at risk will be simply to drag the protective 
standard for refugees toward the lowest common denominator of what is possible to 
secure for the internally displaced. He adds that this would not be a victory for fairness, 
but rather a lost opportunity to guarantee protection.  
4.3 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
All fundamental human rights are applicable to IDPs, given that they have not 
crossed an internationally recognised border and continue as full-worthy citizens of their 
own country. But before the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were 
introduced and acknowledged in resolutions for the UN in 1998, international 
organizations and NGOs frequently complained that no legal instrument existed to 
guide their work with the internally displaced. Governments similarly found that there 
was no instrument to consult when drafting laws to protect the internally displaced. A 
myriad of provisions can be found in international human rights and humanitarian law, 
and in refugee law by analogy, but some are applicable in certain circumstances and not 
in others. But there was not one instrument to set forth these principles in a coherent 
fashion. Even if Bugnion (2001) argues that both human rights and humanitarian law 
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cover all people, including the IDPs, these laws have proved insufficient in their 
protection of the internally displaced. For example, no explicit guarantee exists against 
the forcible return of IDPs to places of danger. Governments are also not explicitly 
obliged to accept international humanitarian assistance or to ensure the safe access for 
IDPs to essential facilities and commodities needed for survival. Clear gaps also exist in 
the law when it comes to personal documentation for the displaced or restitution or 
compensation for property lost during displacement. International lawyers identified 
seventeen areas where there were insufficient protection owing to inexplicit articulation, 
and eight areas where there were significant gaps in the law (Cohen 1996:24). 
With this as a backdrop, it seemed useful to formulate a definitive statement of 
guiding principles that would recapitulate and clarify the existing norms, make explicit 
the grey areas in the law, and remedy identifiable gaps. To obviate a need for ratification 
(and because the political reality is that many governments would not be willing to bind 
themselves through a convention), it was to take the form of a declaration of principles 
whose moral force could, over time, achieve for it the status of customary law (Ibid.). In 
addition to providing a modicum of legal protection for the internally displaced, such a 
declaration would serve the important educational purpose of raising the level of 
international public awareness of the needs of internally displaced. It would also serve 
the practical purpose of giving human rights and humanitarian agencies a document to 
point to when dealing with governments and insurgent forces to gain access to the 
internally displaced.  
Some fear that the increasingly frequent and almost exclusive reliance on the 
Guiding Principles intended specifically to deal with displaced persons, which are not 
binding on states and armed opposition groups, may end up creating the impression that 
international humanitarian law is not applicable. The risks involved in concentrating 
attention on specific types of problems may also be related to the feeble response of the 
international community to situations involving long-term displacement. The 
international community is more inclined to respond to the immediate and visible 
consequences of displacements than commit itself long-term, in a responsible manner, to 
the social development of the entire population affected (Hickel 2001:54).  
The general reception given to the Guiding Principles points very much in the 
direction of increasing use and support, in particular by international organizations, 
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regional bodies, NGOs and an increasing number of governments. They are in particular 
being used to monitor conditions in countries, as the basis for domestic law and policy 
and as an advocacy tool (Bagshaw 2001). The Guiding Principles are welcomed by most 
states, but it still needs to translate into an operational reality in a larger degree than 
today. Modest achievement will be slow and tortuous if the recent fractious debate in the 
last meeting of the millennium at the General Assembly in New York is any guide. 
Michael Kingsley-Nyinah of UNHCR’s Department of International Protection said that 
“In 1948 the Declaration of Human Rights was a major accomplishment, but it was still only a piece of 
paper. It took years before it began to be accepted in practice in many parts of the world. Perhaps that is 
where we are today with the Guiding Principles. It is a first step, but there is a long way to go.” 
Another specialist added, “We have reached a critical plateau in the debate over IDPs and the role 
of the Special Representative. The challenge now will be to turn principles into practice. The Special 
Representative has been a lone voice crying out in the wilderness. The prophet must now begin to deliver” 
(Wilkinson 1999). 
In addition to discussion of a possibly separate legal framework, there is a need to 
clarify who is responsible when states lack political will and capacity to protect their 
citizens. We have seen that there are disagreements as to whether UNHCR can and will 
be the agency providing in-country protection to IDPs. But if not the UNHCR, how can 
the international community ensure protection to the IDPs? There have been put 
forward three proposals as solutions for improving the protection of the IDPs. In 
addition to the one proposal already mentioned, to assign the responsibility of IDPs to 
the UNHCR, there have been suggestions for both a new single IDP agency approach 
and a collaborative approach.  
4.4 A Single Agency Approach 
Despite different steps taken in the United Nations to enhance its capacity to 
respond to situations of internal displacement, a persistent question which is asked is 
whether a new agency should be created within the organisation for providing assistance 
and protection to IDPs. At present no single operational agency in the international 
system has responsibility for IDPs, and there seems to be little international good will 
for creating such an institution. According to Deng (2003 [Personal Interview]) 
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consensus has emerged that the problem is too big for one agency and requires the 
collaborative capacities of the international system. There appear to be many persuasive 
arguments against the establishment of a new agency (Chimni 2000a). In Masses in 
Flight (1998:169) Cohen and Deng points out: 
To begin with, it would duplicate the many existing resources and capacities that have 
already become involved with the internally displaced…The cost of a new institution 
would be substantial …There is also the concern that it would foster dependency by 
encouraging governments to call upon the new agency to address problems that should 
fall within their own purview…A new agency for the internally displaced is certain to 
arouse considerable opposition from governments that believe the problem belongs within 
the domestic jurisdiction of states. 
As an alternative they suggest that: 
Assigning responsibility to an existing organization such as UNHCR could be an 
effective solution if it were assured the support of other agencies with skills needed to deal 
with the different phases of internal displacement, and if it received full back-up support 
from the UN system (Ibid:185). 
 
The agencies which could lend support to the UNHCR include the ICRC, the 
United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund, the World Health Organisation, and the International 
Organisation for Migration.  
But Chimni (2000b:251) argues that refugee issues are too important to be left to 
specialised organisations like the UNHCR. The international refugee regime extends far 
beyond UNHCR; and it is changing rapidly and other actors like NGOs are involved and 
should be considered to be new important actors who can help filling the protection gap. 
4.5 New Actors 
As the number of displaced persons has increased dramatically in recent decades, so 
too have the number of organisations and groups trying to help them. Under the 
Geneva Conventions, the ICRC is mandated to protect and assist the victims of armed 
conflict (Wilkinson 1999). Without specific international institutions covering the IDPs, 
and difficulties in applying general agreements like the Geneva Conventions, donors 
have been reluctant to intervene in internal conflicts and help this group. 
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The increasing role of humanitarian NGOs in collecting and disseminating human 
rights information at the field level, has been one of the most dramatic changes in 
protection in recent years. International organisations are primary vehicles for stating 
community norms and for collective legitimisation. They are, as Barnett and Finnemore 
expresses it in Chimni (2001:158) ‘ontologically independent’ and ‘powerful actors who 
can have independent effects on the world’. Though NGOs have a range of agendas, 
their part in bringing about change in state behaviour should not be underestimated. 
Although media coverage of the issue of internal displacement remains rare, civil society, 
media and NGOs have played an important role in upholding and promoting the state’s 
responsibilities. A collaborative and responsive network on both national and 
international footings is important to enhance the process of building up the state’s 
responsibility.  
While UNHCR’s mandate is to ensure that refugees receive protection and to find 
durable solutions to their problems, it often has its hand tied by reluctant or frustrated 
host governments. In the field, this means that NGOs and Red Cross players need to 
position their own programmes around these weaknesses in the international protection 
system, by either filling gaps or encouraging others in doing so (ICVA 2002). A key role 
that the transnational activist and NGO network can perform is to place “norm-violating 
states on the international agenda”. In this regard it is suggested that an annual report be 
compiled on the record of individual states in the realm of refugee protection. For 
instance, the collective production of an annual Refugee Watch would persuade states to 
enter into dialogue with the transnational NGO network. The process of argumentation 
would be used to make states justify their claims and reflect on their ‘interests’ in the 
realistic hope that it would help transform behaviour. The arguments advanced could be 
both legal and moral (Chimni 2001:163). It is suggested that NGOs and the UNHCR 
should try to complement each other in their work on protecting the IDPs. This leads us 
to the collaborative approach, favoured by both the Secretary General Representative on 
Internally Displaced People, Francis Deng and the High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Ruud Lubbers. 
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4.6 A Collaborative Approach 
When he assumed his post, Deng believed that one organization should become the 
recognized ‘lead’ agency for IDPs, a logical candidate being UNHCR. But now he 
believes a collaborative effort of existing organizations is best at tackling the problem. 
Nevertheless, there is a need to strengthen the collaborative approach in order to 
overcome the challenging problems of coordination and the gaps in response that 
frequently arise under the present arrangement, especially in the realm of protection 
(Deng 2003 [Personal Interview]). 
This is the approach that has received most attention regarding action vis-à-vis 
IDPs, and which is the one in use. In a letter dated March 2001 to the Under Secretary-
General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Kenzo Oshima, 
the High Commissioner for Refugees, Ruub Lubbers writes in favour of an inter-agency 
mechanism to initiate action on IDPs. He further says that the appropriate agency in 
charge of that mechanism should be the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), with the support of the inter-agency IDP Unit (UNHCR 
2001a [Letter]).  
After this exchange of letters, the Internal Displacement Unit at OCHA agreed to 
take the lead in mapping out the activities of UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) members on behalf of the IDPs and undertake analyses of the results. An IASC 
Protection Policy paper (OCHA 2002b) described that  
“the scale and multifaceted nature of displacement crises have led the IASC to recognise that an 
effective and comprehensive response to the protection and assistance needs of displaced persons necessitates 
a collaborative approach. Thus, the management model for assistance and protection in situations of 
internal displacement, rather than a single agency approach, is one that involves government officials, 
UN agencies, international organisations, and international and local NGOs”. 
 In its simplest form, the collaborative approach relies on an operational framework 
that builds upon the complementary capacity of agencies and organisations at the field 
level, including national and non-state actors. In addition to coordination forums and 
information sharing mechanisms, the collaborative approach also anticipates inter alia, a 
common policy or strategy formulation to ensure different actors are working towards a 
common goal (Ibid.). 
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Protection, however, is identified as the biggest ongoing flaw in the collaborative 
international approach. Humanitarian agencies are still not succeeding in making 
protection operational in the field, and there is inadequate guidance to humanitarian 
workers as to how to “do” protection. Also noted is that protection from displacement is 
not being effectively achieved (Weiss 2002). Despite advantages to the existing 
collaborative approach, there are problems with lack of accountability, responsibility and 
consistency in who is doing what at the national level, as well as within the international 
community. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Is there need for a new international legal framework? The IDPs fall in between the 
division of ethical and legal concepts of justice. As a result of global changes there is 
definitely a need for an international debate on how this group of people involuntarily 
displaced can be better protected and by whom. The important question is whether a 
person needs international protection because it is not available in the country of origin. 
IDPs are more vulnerable than refugees in that they often face a much more difficult 
and hazardous future, and if they cannot look to their state for protection, they should 
be able to look elsewhere. 
There are disagreements as to whether a new international legal framework is 
needed. By establishing a new law some argue that it will undermine the existing one, 
others that it will rather draw attention to the protection gap, and make it possible to 
provide for the assistance and protection needs of IDPs. Ratifying a new binding law is a 
very long and complex process which may never be achieved. States are, and will 
probably always be, very reluctant to sign a law which may affect state sovereignty. But a 
new international law cannot alone fill the protection gap, it is also important to 
implement what already exists in the field.  
However, the Guiding Principles, a non-binding instrument, is an incremental step 
towards establishing minimum conditions for the treatment of the displaced. Also, these 
Guiding Principles have made explicit the grey areas in the law and help identify the 
protection gap. Maybe most importantly, they serve the educational purpose of raising 
the level of international public awareness of the needs of the IDPs. Although they need 
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to be translated into an operational reality to a greater extent than today, over time one 
can hope that they will achieve the status as of customary law. 
To overcome the obstacles of negative sovereignty and ensure protection to the 
IDPs, someone has to be in charge of implementing international law and responsibility. 
There are disagreements as to whether this should be the UNHCR, a single IDP agency 
or through a collaborative approach is arguable. But there seems to be no international 
political will to give this responsibility to the UNHCR, or to a new single IDP 
institution. The main argument is that the subject of internal displacement is too 
complex for one agency to handle. Most likely to fill the protection gap is the 
collaborative approach, which is being practised today and includes both international 
agencies and organisations at the field level, national and non-state actors. However, this 
approach clearly needs to be strengthened, especially the coordination between the 
different actors involved. Lack of coordination between and within the UN, the state 
and NGOs is one of the main challenges in Colombia in protecting the IDPs. The next 
chapter will illustrate the weaknesses of the collaborative approach in Colombia, and that 
the international community still has a long way to go regarding responsibility, 
consistency, resources, priorities, implementation and accountability in protecting the 
IDPs. 
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5. Colombia –the Reality of  IDPs 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 
                                             
Why Colombia? 
Globally, an increase of internal conflicts and more restrictive asylum policies have 
resulted in new displacement and a protection gap for IDPs, and this is also the case in 
Colombia. This has affected the principle of sovereignty and the work of UNHCR. By 
using Colombia as an example, my aim is to illustrate how this manifests itself in reality. 
IDPs do challenge the principle of sovereignty and the work of UNHCR, the question 
being whether it does in Colombia. Colombia is an example of a state which has no 
political will to improve the protection of IDPs. As a result, Colombia supports and is 
maintaining the protection gap. Lack of clear international principles describing how to 
fill this protection gap causes new displacement and millions of people have to live in a 
political vacuum between state sovereignty and international responsibility.  
The reason I have chosen Colombia as an empirical case is that the country has over 
two million IDPs, fourth highest in the world.7 It would seem reasonable to claim that 
problems experienced by IDPs in Colombia, are often the same problems faced by IDPs 
around the world. However, what makes Colombia different from other countries with 
IDPs, is ironically that Colombia has the best developed national legal framework to 
protect and assist the IDPs. Unfortunately there is a discrepancy between rhetoric and 
action where some states recognise obligations towards IDPs and refugees in practice 
some do so only in law. Colombia may have the rhetoric, but obviously lacks the action. 
But lack of success in implementing this legal framework proves that the international 
community must apply pressure to make the state accountable. 
 
7 After Sudan, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), respectively. 
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Another reason for choosing Colombia as an empirical illustration is that being   
member of “Groups of Friends”8, Norway is involved in the peace process in Colombia 
and in 2001 Norway opened an Embassy in the capital Bogotá. The subject of internal 
displacement should therefore also be of interest to the Norwegian Government. In 
addition, during the time while Jan Egeland was the UN Representative of the Secretary-
General in Colombia, Colombia received a great deal of attention in Norway. However, 
after his departure at the end of 2002, this attention has become less both from the 
Norwegian government and the Norwegian media. But because of the scale of the 
problem, lack of awareness and therefore sympathy for the plight of the internally 
displaced, the issue of internal displacement deserves much more attention than it 
receives today.  
This chapter is divided after the three former chapters. First, after an introduction 
on the internal conflict in Colombia, I will relate the state of Colombia’s relation to the 
principle of sovereignty and its responsibility towards IDPs. Second, I will present the 
role of UNHCR and their work with IDPs, as well as how the restrictive asylum policy 
from the neighbour countries make it necessary for the UNHCR to work within 
Colombia, and where peace communities9 (safety zones) have been established by the 
IDPs themselves as an alternative to crossing an international border. Third, I will 
review Colombia’s national legal framework for IDPs, and discuss whether the 
collaborative approach is filling the protection gap in the absence of implementation of 
Colombian IDP legislation.  
The modalities of displacement, the numbers of people estimated to be affected, the 
areas of origin and of destination of those displaced and the number of state and non-
state actors involved in the problem are four of the elements that give a special character 
to the phenomenon of displacement in Colombia (Roldán 2001) 
                                              
8 Cuba, France, Norway, Spain and Switzerland constitutes “Group of Friends”. This group is supposed to play a role in 
the peace process and in negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN), although for the moment the peace process is 
absent. Norway was also part of a group with ten other countries whose role was to facilitate negotiations with the Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), but this peace process can now be said to be a dead (Aasheim 2003 [e-mail]). 
 
9 Peace Community is the Colombians attempt on creating a safety zone for civilians. 
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5.1.2 
                                             
Figures 
It is difficult to estimate the number of those displaced, when often those affected 
do not register and some persons are displaced numerous times. Also, the majority of 
those displaced prefer to hide in fear of new persecution (ACT 2002). But it should be 
noted that both government and non-governmental sources agree that not only is there a 
steady increase in the total number of IDPs in Colombia, but also that the phenomenon 
is taking on crisis proportions (TGD 2001).  
During the first nine months in 2002, the Colombian NGO Consultancy for 
Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES) estimated the numbers of new displaced 
people at 353,120.10 A total estimated 2.45 million Colombians were internally displaced 
at the end of 2001, including about 342,000 who became displaced during the year. This 
total does not include displaced persons who returned to their places of origin or 
resettled elsewhere. Nor does it provide information on the percentage of persons who 
were displaced more than once (CODHES 2001 and 2002). What makes Colombia 
special is that there are as many as over 300 000 people fleeing each year, compared to 
other conflicts where groups often flee within a certain period.  
An estimated 80,000 to 105,000 Colombians are living in refugee-like circumstances 
in neighbouring countries, primarily Venezuela (50,000 to 75,000) and Ecuador (30,000) 
while some 23,200 Colombian refugees and asylum seekers were in other countries 
(USCR 2002).11 
The government of Colombia also compiles data on displacement, and estimates 
that about 525,000 displaced persons in total are in need of assistance. However, the 
government estimates only take into account new displacement since 1995 (during the 
first two years that the registration system was in place, in 1995 and 1996, the 
government only registered about 3,400 people). Ever since 2000, when the registration 
system became fully operational, many displaced persons have avoided registering with 
government agencies, often because they do not trust the government (Ibid. 2002). Also, 
 
10 These numbers are absolute. 
11 In estimating the number of displaced in Colombia, and for other figures regarding internally displaced Colombians, 
these numbers rely primarily on the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), a Colombian 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) that works closely with the Catholic church, other NGOs, and local authorities to 
produce detailed statistics on displacement in Colombia. The figure of 2.45 million displaced Colombians is cumulative from 
1985 and may include a number of people who have returned home. 
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the government does not consider displaced people as such after two years, but some 
have been displaced for over ten years (US DOS 2001). 
5.1.3 Causes of Displacement in Colombia  
The internal conflict in Colombia is one of the most prolonged and violent internal 
conflicts in the world today. The causes of internal displacement vary, sometimes leading 
individuals or families to flee, while at other times entire communities abandon a 
settlement together. In order of predominance, the causes of internal displacement are 
the following: collective threats; armed confrontations; massacres; individualised threats; 
direct attacks on population centres; and to avoid forced recruitment by illegal armed 
actors (UNHCR 2002b). Massacres are the single most common reason for population 
displacement (an average of 224 people displaced per massacre) 
(E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3). The coca growing areas of Colombia, without exception, are 
another cause that produces displacement. Apart from for economic needs (for lack of 
viable alternatives), local populations are often pressured by guerrillas, paramilitaries, or 
drug traffickers to involve themselves in coca cultivation, thereby increasing the risk of 
repercussions from armed groups, and hence displacement. Paramilitaries (between 46 
and 63 percent), guerrillas (between 12 and 13 percent) state agents (0.65 percent) and 
unknown agents (19 to 24 percent) are among those allegedly accountable for 
displacement (Ibid.).  
Plan Colombia attracted a new wave of media attention to the region (Ruiz 2001). 
In 2000, Pastrana’s administration requested assistance from the international 
community through an aid package, “Plan Colombia”, designed to address the narcotics 
business, socio-economic development, human rights, and the country’s insurgency. The 
United States has committed military resources to Colombia as part of this plan, 
primarily to support a “war on drugs”. But through-out there has been a concern among 
human rights organisations that U.S. military aid could lead to a further escalation of the 
armed confrontation (Leonard 2002). In an international NGO declaration from Costa 
Rica 2000, the international organisations were convinced that Plan Colombia as 
conceived, would not only contribute to an escalation to the conflict, but also result in 
more deaths in Colombia and lead to a regionalisation of the conflict. According to 
CODHES, Plan Colombia exacerbated displacement in 2001, and 18 months into the 
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program, more coca was being grown in Colombia than before fumigation began (USCR 
2002). Interviews I conducted with national and international NGOs in Colombia in 
May 2001, all expressed concern regarding Plan Colombia and how the civil population 
is directly effected by the fumigation, which causes further displacement. 
5.1.4  A War of Land 
The roots of the conflict in Colombia are multiple and complex. In such a long, 
protracted struggle it has become very difficult to distinguish between causes and effects. 
Over time, instruments that originated as means have transformed into ends. According 
to Jan Egeland (2003 [Personal Interview]) an evil circle constitutes the heart of the 
conflict. Violence causes conflict, conflict causes humanitarian suffering and new IDPs, 
which again cause new displeasure and trigger new violence. The dimensions of the 
conflict are enormous. Problems such as economic inequalities, the weakness of the 
state, discriminatory political institutions, elite politics and interventionism are viewed as 
the root of the conflict (Azcarate 1999).  
Colombia is a state out of order. It has a government, administration, elections, 
parliament and laws, but a large part of its territory is not under the administrative 
control of the state and is either no man’s land or it is directly or indirectly controlled by 
the guerrilla organisations such as the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) or by increasingly powerful paramilitary groups. The 
fundamental principle that the modern state should have a legitimate monopoly on the 
use of force bears no weight. At the same time, the system is highly inefficient. The 
country’s economy is deformed by illegal drug production and exports. People have no 
confidence that the government or any other institution can protect them –and they are 
correct in their lack of confidence. Colombia is one of the most dangerous countries in 
the world to be a judge, a human rights advocate, a labour leader, a journalist, a farmer, a 
Presidential candidate, or even an ordinary citizen (Thompson 2002). Impunity and the 
denial of justice continue to be amongst the most serious concerns in Colombia. 
Impunity is close to 100% for human rights violations (CCJ 2001). 
It is important to recall the complexity of the conflict owing to the multiplicity of 
actors and interests involved. Not a single actor in the armed conflict has a clean record. 
First, there are the state armed forces (comprising the army, navy and air force) and 
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National Police, both of which are attached to the Ministry of Defence. Second, there 
are various paramilitary groups, organised under an umbrella group known as United 
Self-Defence Groups of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia -AUC). Though 
they no longer enjoying legal authority, as was the case from 1968 to 1989, the 
paramilitary groups have effectively been institutionalised through the existence of 
“special private security and vigilante services”12 and perform functions of public order 
similar to those of the armed force and police. AUC claim to have a force of over 11,000 
fighters, and operates with as many as eight hundred troops at a time (HRW 2002b). 
Third, there are the guerrilla forces which are organised into several distinct and 
autonomous groups. By 1999, guerrillas operated in 30 of the nation’s 32 departments. 
Foremost among these is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia –Ejército Popular FARC-EP), which is the 
strongest of the guerrilla forces militarily. Their present strength is estimated at 17,000 
fighters. Comparatively smaller and possessing less military strength is the National 
Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional -ELN). The ELN consist of an 
estimated 4,500 fighters (UNHCR 2002b). Record levels of poverty and rural 
unemployment drive young peasants into the ranks of both guerrillas and paramilitaries 
(Carrigan 2001).13 All of Colombia’s departments are affected by displacement, except 
the islands of San Andrés and Providencia. The top-five departments generating 
displacement are Antioquia, Magdalena, Cauca, Bolivar and Chocó (UNHCR 2002b). 
The victims are non-combatants, mostly farmers who flee to the cities in search of safety 
So complex is the violence of Colombia that often while some people are fleeing one 
region in terror, others are arriving in the same region (Thompson 2002).  
The Colombian political scene has long been dominated by two rival political 
parties, the Conservative Party (Partido Social Conservador –PSC) and the Liberal Party 
(Partido Liberal –PL). The armed conflict has its origin in the 1950s, when the 
government and insurgency groups battled for political power. Since the 1980s, 
paramilitary and self-defence groups have also taken up arms against the rebels. Caught 
                                              
12 Previously known as “Convivir” 
13 There are also smaller guerrilla groups in Colombia. These are more regional in nature, such as Ejército Popular de 
Liberación (EPL), Frente Jaime Bateman Cayón, Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista, Ejército Revolucionario Popular and 
others. 
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in the middle is Colombia’s civilian population, which has been used, mostly abused, by 
all combatants for their own ends. Escalating conflicts tend to polarise the community 
around them. Formerly neutral parties gravitate or are pulled toward one side or the 
other. The scale and dimension of the violations of basic human rights of the IDPs are 
so perilous that their survival instinct drives IDPs away from the violators; but reality 
confines them within the country’s boundary, very often protected or controlled by the 
violators themselves. In a situation like this, the IDPs are like trapped birds whose fate 
absolutely depends upon the wishes of the violators (Chakma 2000:227). With time the 
original ideological rationale for the fighting has been lost amid unholy alliances with 
drug traffickers and peace negotiations played out while war efforts intensify. The fight 
for political power and full social and political participation within the country is also 
closely linked to forced displacement (Delgado and Lægreid 2001:205).  
The rise of drug trafficking cartels in the late 1970s and early 1980s transformed 
both Colombian society and the nature of the civil conflict. Widespread and high level 
corruption, intimidation and murders weakened the government, particularly the law 
enforcement apparatus, as well as the influence of the traditional political parties. As the 
state targeted the drug cartels, FARC and paramilitaries became increasingly engaged in 
drug cultivation, processing and trafficking. This has allowed them to obtain finances for 
recruitment, arming, as well, as independence from the Communist Party and large 
landowners, respectively (UNHCR 2002b). The investments done by FARC have 
enabled the guerrilla to establish an economic independence that few guerrilla 
movements in the world have been able to achieve, except from the Lebanese and the 
Palestinian guerrillas, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) 
and the Taliban (Afghanistan) (Richani 2001). What we see is that drug trafficking has 
been rewarding. The economic facts of the matter are that as long as there is a 
multibillion dollar market available to Colombia without any alternatives, Colombians 
will continue to grow coca. The explanation for Colombia’s booming business is seen in 
its tradition of individualism, with few social controls (The Economist 2001b). 
In 2001, political violence became increasingly urban, with clashes and selective 
killings occurring in cities. The displaced often settle on the outskirts of large cities in 
crowded conditions without proper sanitation, and with limited access to health care, 
education or employment (UNHCR 2002b). Nearly 50 percent of displaced Colombians 
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are unemployed, and those who find work usually obtain only poorly paid day labour. 
Only 34 percent of displaced Colombians have access to health care and, according to 
the Colombia’s human rights ombudsman, only 15 percent of displaced children attend 
schools (USCR 2002). The priority needs of displaced persons are food security, 
housing, health care, education and income-generating projects (TGD 2001). There are 
no large welfare centres monitored by UNHCR or other agencies available to receive the 
displaced population (E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3). Kofi Asomani, the United Nations 
Special Co-ordinator on Internal Displacement of the Office for the Co-ordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, visited Colombia in August 2002 and concluded that the conflict 
had “catastrophic consequences” for the civilian population. Despite government 
programs meant to assist the displaced, Asomani found that they continued to suffer 
extreme hardship, living in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions with limited access to 
basic services (HRW 2002b). 
Observers suggest that the increasing incidence and intensity of acts of aggression 
against civilians is part of a deliberate strategy by armed groups to extend their sphere of 
influence and gain territorial control. Indeed, there is rarely direct confrontation among 
armed groups. Instead, displacement normally follows a pattern of rural farmers being 
accused of collaborating with the enemy, followed by direct threats on their life, which 
ultimately force them to flee to urban centres (Global IDP Project 2001a). But the very 
fact of having fled heightens suspicions of their allegiances and intensifies their risk of 
being targeted. As a result many try to blend anonymously into communities of urban 
poor (Deng 1999). Most observers agree that the fight for strategic territorial control 
affects the whole territory of Colombia today. The conflict in Colombia, while 
differentiated among regions, is a veritable “guerra de territorio” or war of land (Muggah 
2000:138). A form of reverse land reform is taking place. Powerful people and their allies 
are displacing the less powerful (Thompson 2002). Strong ties between landowners, 
government officials and paramilitaries have blocked any serious agrarian reform (Global 
IDP Project 2003d). Complaints regarding links between members of the paramilitary 
groups and state officials continued to be received during 2002 (E/CN.4/2003/13).  
A problem is that few IDPs return to their original home. A majority of IDPs are 
expected to stay in areas to which they have fled, usually in the large cities. According to 
CODHES, only 24 percent would like to return to their places or origin. This figure 
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reflects IDPs’ low confidence in the government’s ability to provide safety in areas of 
return (Global IDP Project 2001a). 
Displacement disproportionately affects Colombia’s ethnic minorities: Afro-
Colombians in coastal areas and indigenous populations in various parts of the countries 
are often targeted (UNHCR 2002b). UNHCR has reported that indigenous and black 
populations constitute one third of the IDP population even though they make up only 
11 percent of the total national population (US DOS 2001). However, the conflict in 
Colombia did not arise as a result of ethnic or racial exclusion (Chernick 1999:161). The 
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis 
Deng, describes displacement and harassment in Colombia as a form of “political 
cleansing”, in contrast to the phenomenon of “ethnic cleansing” that goes on in other 
parts of the world. In the latter case, governments uproot or wage wars against groups 
on the basis of their ethnic identity whereas in Colombia, persons are uprooted because 
of their association or perceived association with political insurgencies (Cohen and 
Sanchez-Garzoli 2001). Also, the disproportionately high numbers of displaced Afro-
Colombians can be explained by the proximity of indigenous communities to designated 
reserves containing 95 percent of the nation’s natural resources (Global IDP Project 
2003d). 
In order to explain the conflict in Colombia, there were, according to Richani 
(2001), two important variables not necessarily linked to its root causes to consider. One, 
the balance of power between the state and the guerrillas have not allowed any one to 
win decisively over the other; Second, the ability of the three main actors in the 
Colombian civil war, -the state, the guerrillas and organised criminal organisations, 
particularly the narco-traffickers and their paramilitary groups- to adjust to a war 
condition through which the three actors invariably manage to accumulate economic and 
political resources that outweigh the costs of war. Individuals take the law into their own 
hands because of the inefficiency of the judicial system. Obviously the privatisation of 
security has not succeeded in reducing the level of violence. Threats against local 
authorities are common and countrywide. The precarious situation of alcaldes (mayors), 
consejales (council members) and other municipal authorities is illustrative of the 
weakness of the state. Roughly one fifth (about 200 out of 1,098) of Colombia’s 
municipalities are without state security presence (for instance army or police). In many 
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smaller municipalities the limited police presence is no guarantee against threats by illegal 
armed actors (UNHCR 2002b). 
5.1.5 
                                             
The Peace Process 
The peace initiatives which the Government of President Andrés Pastrana launched 
in 1998, soon after taking office, with the two main guerrilla groups, FARC and ELN, 
ended abruptly in the first months of 2002 without yielding the positive result that many 
sectors in the country had been hoping for (E/CN.4/2003/13). Pastrana also seized the 
zona del despeje (“clear zone”), the large area that the president had ceded to the FARC 
in 1999.14 During the peace process, under the Pastrana administration, the third party 
domestic and international actors, including the UN, could potentially have played a 
more decisive role had they been allowed to (ICG 2002b). In Colombia, the armed 
conflict escalated further after communication had been broken between the parties 
(Azcarate 1999). 
Avaro Uribe, an independent candidate supported by the Conservative Party, 
Partido Social Conservador (PSC), was inaugurated President of Colombia on 7 August 
2002 with a strong electoral mandate to fulfil his pledge to enhance the state’s authority 
and guarantee security. Uribe is a former governor in the region Antioqia, with Medellin 
as capital. As recently as 2000 he was viewed as the leader of the country’s right-wing 
fringe, known primarily as an outspoken opponent of peace talks. During his period as a 
governor he established private security groups, “convivir”, which strengthened the 
paramilitary in the region. The new president is very controversial, but Uribe’s work 
ethic, pursuit of solutions, and law-abiding image has won him broad support among the 
Colombian people. Still, several decrees aimed at improving security have alarmed 
defenders of human rights and civil liberties world-wide, though they enjoy the Bush 
Administration’s enthusiastic support (Isacson 2002). The new government has sold the 
idea that it can score a military victory over the guerrillas, while the guerrillas seem 
convinced they can win the war. They believe the only alternative to peace talks is a 
policy of military deterrence, with more death and destruction as a result until people are 
 
14 A demilitarized zone (Zona de Despeje -DMZ), comprising five municipalities, of the approximate size of Switzerland 
(42,129 square kilometres) was established, the idea being to have a neutral area where the government and guerrillas could meet 
to talk peace. The DMZ, an essential FARC demand, was originally created for only 90 days. FARC control of this zone was 
extended 11 times until February 2002 despite a lack of progress in achieving peace. 
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convinced that this is not the way to Colombia’s future. As former Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Colombia, Jan Egeland, expressed it “Military victory might have been 
decisive at a time when Norwegians, Swedes, Germans and French and Iraqis and Kuwaitis fought 
against each other in international conflicts, but the conflicts of today are internal, the actors many, the 
messages unclear, and the victims are exclusively the civil population. Military actions only results in 
more violence, terrorism and insecurity. At the same time valuable time is thrown away before some 
people realise that a conflict cannot be won at the battle ground, but rather at the negotiation table” 
(Egeland 2001). Over 40 years of civil war without a settlement should itself be a reason 
to return to the negotiation table. 
5.2 The Colombian State’s Responsibility towards the IDPs 
There is no balance between state sovereignty and human rights in Colombia. 
Where the government is part of the internal conflict, which is the case of Colombia, 
IDPs become a human rights issue. With one of the most comprehensive and judicially 
advanced IDP legislation, Colombia has every opportunity to protect her citizens. But 
they seem to lack the means and political will. Unfortunately, the subject of internal 
displacement is not a priority on the government’s agenda, and the implementation is 
still missing (Egeland 2003 [Personal Interview]). The government consider IDPs as a 
“public order problem” rather than a human rights problem (Global IDP Project 2003e). 
The right of the state and not its citizens continue to take priority in the law and politics 
of international human rights. 
5.2.1 Sovereignty as Responsibility 
Sovereignty should be perceived in terms of protection and respect for the rights of 
their citizens and promotion of international peace and security. However, the failure of 
the Colombian state to meet its obligations towards its citizens has drawn the attention 
of the international community and mobilised it to take on protection role. But is the 
government the only actor responsible for IDPs, or when the displacement is done by an 
organised group, to what extent does it bear responsibility and culpability for the 
conditions it creates (Aluwihare 2000:68)? In a report from the Human Rights 
Commission in 2001, it was explained that a state that is not able to control its borders 
and has lost the monopoly of force will lead to de facto division of the territory among 
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different actors such as drug traffickers, guerrillas, paramilitary groups, oil companies 
with private armies, and others. In the case of Colombia, the state has delegated the 
counter-insurgency to private actors, creating what is called the “privatisation of the 
war” that facilitates the entry of mercenaries in the conflict (E/CN.4/2001/18).  
The Government’s response towards IDPs is paradoxical. The Government has 
granted emergency humanitarian aid to only 20% of the displaced 
(E/CN.4/2002/NGO/89). Government officials continued to estimate that 70 to 80 
percent of humanitarian assistance received to aid displaced persons is provided by the 
ICRC and NGOs (US DOS 2001). This also illustrates the role of the UN in Colombia. 
The state has sought to strengthen existing (albeit ambiguous) institutional mechanisms 
to better accommodate the perceived needs of the displaced, without taking into 
consideration their acute vulnerabilities, like employment and food security. The system 
depends largely on political will and effective institutional machinery at the municipal 
(implementing level). The reality on the ground suggests, however, that civil servants are 
not particularly well-informed with respect to their obligation under Law 387 established 
in 1997. Certainly, there exist few incentives to convince either locally or regionally 
elected authorities to respond to IDPs from other departments. But in spite of the much 
lauded decentralisation and reform process local authorities have not been adequately 
prepared (Muggah 2000:145). The state’s efforts to comply with international 
recommendations on human rights protection issues have failed to produce tangible 
results. There has been progress in some areas, such as registration of the displaced 
population and greater national coverage, but that has only been accompanied by limited 
action to protect and assist victims and ineffective preventive policies 
(E/CN.4/2002/17). The subject of internal displacement still has a long way to go to 
receive the attention which it deserves from the Colombian state (Egeland 2003 
[Personal Interview]). 
All parties in the conflict are responsible for the forced displacement of large 
numbers of civilians. But as a sovereign state, Colombia has the obligation to protect, 
provide and fulfil international obligations, including the enactment of relevant internal 
legislation, and to abstain from enacting legislation that is contrary to international laws, 
as well as to punish those responsible and to provide suitable redress for victims. The 
fact that a violation has taken place does not mean that the state has failed to fulfil its 
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duty. A key element in identifying failure to fulfil the obligation is the fact that failure has 
been systematic. On the basis of responsibility, development and spread of paramilitary 
activity, and the different types of conduct, the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 
Mary Robinson has reiterated in her various reports on Colombia that the actions of the 
paramilitary groups entail state responsibility for the violations of human rights. The 
state and its institutions have been increasingly absent from many regions of the country, 
which has aggravated the problems of good governance and legitimacy 
(E/CN.4/2002/17). The state’s legal responsibility both for the attacks carried out 
directly by Colombian armed forces and for those committed by paramilitary 
organisations with state support, acquiescence or connivance were also emphasised by 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders, in a 
report from a mission in Colombia in 2001 (E/CN.4/2002/106/Add.2).  
But in his response on 21 March 2002 to the report from UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the Vice-president of Colombia said the following:  
“(…) our country does not face a war or peace dichotomy, as shown superficially by the 
media. Even if it seems hard to understand, the conflict that surrounds us has not taken 
over or affected internal unity in our society, and it has not stopped the evolution of our 
democratic system. What we are confronting is a war put together by illegal groups that 
do not add up to more than 0.1% of the population, against the legitimate state and 
civil society. We are facing challenges against violence as usually democracies do: using 
the means granted by the Constitution and the law effectively and ethically and against 
all forms of violence, without exceptions. And we are doing it as a state of law: 
respecting fundamental rights and guarantees of all citizens who have entrusted their 
defence and protection and who have confidence in their institutions and its men and 
women that represent and defend them. (…) In order for our task to be more 
productive, we have received the support of the international community and will 
continue to request it. (…) We do not ignore the obligations we have with the 
Colombian people (E/CN.4/2002/172).” 
 
 The Colombian state does not deny or conceal the serious human rights situation 
which the country faces, but equally in the above statement, the state does not accept 
institutional responsibility in its own parts, and blames the harmful humanitarian and 
social effects on guerrilla war, problems of paramilitarism and drug-trafficking. The 
Colombian Government also claims that the best strategy with regard to the subject of 
human rights is peace, a political solution to the armed conflict. According to the 
Colombian Government, the Social Solidarity Network (Red de Solidaridad Social -
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RSS)15 has made important efforts to attend to the population displaced by armed 
conflict and agrees with the UNHCHR that greater efforts must be made to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to prevent displacement (E/CN.4/2002/172). 
The alarming figures indicate that one of the main concerns should be to focus on 
preventing new displacement. Unfortunately, Colombia’s weakest component is 
displacement prevention, as is shown by the way the problem has grown and spread. 
During the last couple of years, over 300,000 Colombians have been displaced each year, 
and there is no capacity or political will to deal with it. However, Colombian IDP 
legislation and policy documents have given prevention quite a lot of attention. They 
suggest preventive activities to be taken by different institutions. One of these measures 
is the “Early Warning System” (SAT). But early warning indicators have failed to prevent 
and protect persons from displacement (Deng 2002). There is no adequate discernible 
state policy or comprehensive strategy for translating the regulations into concrete 
programmes. With the state army as part of the conflict, there is no mechanism that can 
make the system effective (Ruiz 2001 [Personal Interview]). At times, the state seems to 
act more as an observer than as a genuine protector of the civilian population. There is 
little commitment to prioritising the matter. This seems evident from the limited 
resource allocation and spending; the lack of clear instructions to the security forces to 
prioritise protection of the population; the general failure to punish those responsible for 
omissions; the widespread impunity of those responsible for displacements; and the fact 
that the local committees are not playing their part in preventing displacement 
(E/CN.4/2002/17). In cases where the population has been warned of a possible 
massacre, they occasionally choose to stay because of lack of alternatives and money 
(Kvernmo 2001 [Personal Interview]) 
The Ombudsman (Municipal Ombudsman -MO) has expressed concern that many 
“early warning” activities have not been acted upon either by the police or the army. 
According to Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) (E/CN.4/2002/NGO/89), early 
warnings were not taken into account, and those issuing such warnings were often 
discredited. It is not necessarily the early warning that is missing, but the nature of the 
system’s response. A problem is the relationship between the early warning system and 
                                              
15 Since 1999, RSS has been the government agency coordinating the National System of Comprehensive Assistance to 
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the military. What can the military gain from the system? A rational will from the state 
army has to be in place (Reed 2001 [Personal Interview]). 
5.2.2 
                                                                                                                                           
Colombia –an Incomplete State 
Some people call Colombia a failed state. This is not correct. According to 
Thompson (2002) Colombia is an incomplete state.16 The majority of Colombians are 
literate, healthy and reasonably prosperous. The Colombian government is 
democratically elected; Colombia has a strong civil society and many progressive 
institutions, ideas and policies. Unfortunately, the majority are dissatisfied with the way 
democracy is operating in practice (The Economist 2001c). The weakness of the 
Colombian state is one of the important causes of the conflict and its escalation. A 
weakened Colombian government and its demoralised armed forces cannot provide for 
the safety of its citizens. Many of the ills of Colombia derive form a single problem: 
violence (Thompson 2002). In several regions of the country entire populations feel 
abandoned, given the state’s failure or inability to protect its citizens from violence 
(IACHR 2001). Individuals and groups feel compelled to provide for their own defence. 
Everyone tries to protect their own life, family and property by using any means 
available. As a result, intrastate security deteriorates further. Private justice replaces 
public justice. The political controversy created around “security co-operatives” 
(“convivir”) is based on different conceptions of the citizen’s right to arm and defend 
collectively when the state has lost control over the public order (Azcarate 1999).  
The Colombian state is incapable of discharging itself of its responsibilities towards 
all those under state jurisdiction. Although the state has increased its capacity to respond 
to internal displacement, the goals and standards set by the National System for Integral 
Attention to the Displaced Population have not yet been achieved (UNHCR 2003c). The 
government has at least accepted international cooperation in providing assistance and 
protection. However, the balance between not interfering too much in internal affairs 
and not diluting the notion of state responsibility is no small issue, but adjusted legal 
IDPs. 
16 In this case I define a failed state as a state where a national government is absent, for instance in Somalia. Colombia 
has both a democratically elected national government and national legal institutions to protect and assist the IDPs. However, 
the state of Colombia is an incomplete state in the sense that the implementation of the national legal framework and the 
function of these national institutions is absent. 
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international principles for how to handle the relationship between state responsibility 
and international responsibility could ease this dilemma. 
5.3 The International Responsibility 
5.3.1 The Acceptance of International Involvement 
The combination of state pressure on governments and normative developments 
have enabled the UNHCR and the international community to become more involved in 
internal affairs though there are still countries that refuse to acknowledge the issue of 
internal displacement and international involvement, like Burma, or even Turkey to a 
lesser extent. But other countries, like Colombia, recognise that they need international 
help to assist and protect their populations. Also, when asked what they most need, IDP 
communities (despite the fact that they have many materials needs) most often request 
international presence and accompaniment (Lægreid 2001). The Government of 
Colombia has demonstrated a readiness to accept or request international co-operation 
in responding to the assistance and protection needs of the IDPs. This is particularly 
true in recent years, with the result that a number of international agencies have 
established or enhanced their presence in Colombia. But it is still very limited compared 
to the scope and magnitude of the humanitarian crises. It is a fight for resources and 
attention from the international community, a fight Colombia, together with southern 
Africa and others are loosing to the crisis in the Middle East (Egeland 2003 [Personal 
Interview]). 
The agencies of the UN system, in accordance with their mandates, have been 
carrying out activities for the prevention of displacement and providing protection and 
care to displaced persons. The work of the agencies comes under areas such as 
emergency humanitarian aid, information systems, reintegration, and institution-building 
(TGD 2001). At its 1996 session, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
requested that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 
establish an office in Colombia on the basis of an invitation extended by the 
Government. The Office was established on 26 November 1996 under an agreement 
signed by the Government and the UNHCHR. The agreement has been extended, at 
President Uribe’s suggestion, until September 2006 (E/CN.4/2003/13). 
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5.3.2 Lack of Co-Operation between the State and the International Community 
Although accepting international involvement, the co-operation between the state 
and the international community has not been satisfactory. At a meeting in Geneva April 
2003, Deng agreed that the Colombian government is willing to talk about internal 
displacement, it is willing to invite the international community, but the state does not 
move to implementation (Global IDP Project 2003e). Being the first UN Office in 
Colombia, there have been various difficulties for the UN impeding its full discharge of 
its UNHCHR mandate in Colombia. This included difficulties in maintaining a dialogue 
with the Government. However, there has been progress but unfortunately, statements 
by senior state officials indicate that they view the pursuance by the UNHCHR Office of 
its mandate as undue interference in the country’s internal affairs. Such statements by 
officials constitute a failure to respect the terms of co-operation provided for in the 
Agreement between the Government and the UNHCHR (E/CN.4/2002/17). But 
despite poor co-operation with Colombian government officials, UNHCHR has 
continued to operate in Colombia.  As UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary 
Robinson noted in the UNHCHR’s annual Colombia report, “the overwhelmingly majority of 
Governmental responses to Office communications about specific cases and situations (such as early 
warnings) have been unsatisfactory, inoperative and purely bureaucratic”. “The end result”, she 
emphasised, was that “the potential of the Office has been greatly underutilized by the Government” 
(HRW 2002b). An example of unsatisfactory co-operation between the UN and 
Colombia was when Jan Egeland, a former special adviser on Colombia to the United 
Nations Secretary-General who frequently visited Colombia to assist in peace talks, was 
prevented by the government from remaining in the country for more than eight days at 
a time. In addition, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human 
Rights Defenders, Hina Jilani, undertook a fact-finding mission to Colombia in October 
at the invitation of the Colombian government. It ended bitterly, after Jilani raised 
questions about the new Attorney General and his commitment to prosecuting cases of 
high-ranking military officers (Ibid.). 
President Uribe deserves praise for inviting the UN to play a mediating role in an 
eventual negotiation with Colombia’s armed groups; this is a measure that his 
predecessor, Andrés Pastrana, did not allow until his peace effort was on the brink of 
collapse. However, Uribe is trying to force the guerrillas to cease fire for renewal of talks, 
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but this could take years and cost thousands of lives. It may be necessary to reconsider 
negotiation before the guns are silenced (Isacson 2002). 
5.3.3 The United States (U.S.) in Colombia –a Hidden Agenda? 
Humanitarian responses to protection of human rights are often guided by geo-
political considerations, and some argue that motivation for intervening often is political, 
strategic and operational. As with the case of the Northern European countries’ 
involvement in Former Yugoslavia, the U.S.’ involvement in Colombia may seem guided 
by these considerations.  
Events in Colombia during 2001 were marked by a series of issues that explain the 
context of the country’s critical situation. Among these, it is worthwhile mentioning the 
campaign in preparation for the upcoming presidential elections in May 2002. Another 
relevant element was the new world situation after 11 September 2001 
(E/CN.4/2002/106/Add.2). As in the rest of the world, “the war against terror” became 
important, which influenced U.S. policy in Colombia, this without consideration for the 
social, economic and political causes of the internal conflict. The U.S. administration 
proposed millions of dollars in counter-terrorism aid to Colombia even as the 
Colombian military refused to break ties with a designated terrorist group, the AUC 
(HRW 2002d). The fact that the conflict in Colombia is backed by economic and 
strategic interests increases its complexity (E/CN.4/2002/106/Add.2). Colombia is the 
third highest recipient of U.S. military aid, after Israel and Egypt. The Colombian 
military is seeking U.S. assistance in its fight against guerrilla forces, chiefly the FARC 
(HRW 2002c). 
Since 1997, all U.S. military aid has been conditioned on Colombia’s progress in 
meeting human rights conditions, among them breaking persistent links to paramilitary 
groups (Ibid.). President Uribe’s commitment to combating paramilitaries is a continuing 
concern, and despite evidence of links between the paramilitary and state army, the U.S. 
has continued its support.  
As Winifred Tate noticed in a North American Congress on Latin America 
(NACLA) Report on the Americas (2000), Washington justifies its involvement in 
Colombia as a “drug war” tactic to destroy the Colombian coca and poppy fields that 
supply cocaine and heroin to the United States. But the reason for supporting the 
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Colombian government is probably more complex and multifaceted. Among them is the 
fact that the area where most narco-traffickers are located, northern Colombia, will 
hardly be touched by the U.S. eradication effort. The region that will be hit, the south, is 
largely governed by guerrillas. The real reasons for the intervention, Tate argues, are 
political, economic and electoral. In the wake of the Cold War, the military-industrial 
complex in the U.S. still seeks power and business, this combined with winning support 
and future votes, Democrats and Republicans compete with “drug war” talk. Colombia 
fits the bill for all these interests—but at a terrible price for that country’s people. U.S. 
interests in Colombia should be questioned and to many observers the militarised anti-
drug strategies are an obvious failure and a national embarrassment (Hagen 2001).  
5.3.4 Seeking Asylum –an Option for IDPs in Colombia? 
UNHCR has been aware of the emergence of more restrictive and hostile attitudes 
towards refugees in the post-Cold War period and the Colombians have also 
experienced a more restrictive asylum policy from the neighbouring countries. 
Neighbouring states do not respect the principle of non-refoulement. Those who have 
managed to cross an international border risk being sent back to Colombia, without 
being given the opportunity to apply for asylum. The development of the displacement 
crisis involving an element of cross-border flight has had important implications for the 
international response, namely the involvement of UNHCR (E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.1). 
According to UNHCR (2003d), the worsening of the conflict in Colombia is 
aggravating a very complex security situation at the border. The situation is now 
explosive. In addition to battling the government, the guerrillas kidnap neighbouring 
Venezuelans and Ecuadorians and the paramilitaries smuggle weapons from bases along 
the Panamanian border (Pardo 2000). This cross-border presence of Colombia’s armed 
parties diminishes the level of security available to Colombian asylum seekers in 
neighbouring states. The Governments of neighbouring countries have expressed 
concern over border crossing. As an example, the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez 
ordered a bombing raid against suspected Colombian irregular forces inside Venezuelan 
territory (UNHCR 2003d). The crossing of borders, though limited, leads to problems of 
protection and non-respect for the doctrine and international practice in the matter of 
refuge, and consequently violations of human rights. At the same time, the authorities 
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frequently question the reasons alleged by Colombians for crossing the border and 
whether the displaced Colombians are covered under the mandate of UNHCR (TGD 
2001). Venezuela especially repeatedly fails to comply with its international obligations to 
protect refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention, calling the Colombians “displaced 
in transit” rather than refugees (HRW 2000). In 2001, UNHCR approached Venezuela’s 
central government requesting access to a group of refugees but the government denied 
the presence of the refugees on Venezuelan soil (UNHCR 2001b). Both UNHCR and 
non-governmental groups like the U.S. Committee for Refugees have documented the 
refoulement of fleeing Colombians, which is not only adding to the numbers of those 
internally displaced, but exposing those who seek asylum to serious risks to their safety 
and well-being (E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.1).  
The UNHCR has said that while it supports all efforts to strengthen border security 
in the region, it is concerned that bona fide asylum seekers may be victimised in the 
process and that carefully built refugee protection standards may be compromised. It 
added that any discussion of security safeguards should start from the assumption that 
most asylum seekers are escaping persecution and violence, and are not themselves the 
perpetrators of such acts. In view of recent developments, the UNHCR has called upon 
governments in the region to guarantee that civilian victims of the Colombian conflict 
continue to have access to their territories and asylum procedures, while ensuring that 
asylum seekers are registered and documented as soon as possible (UNHCR 2002d). The 
internal conflict in Colombia, has become a threat to the whole region, and poses a 
threat to international security. On this basis, the UN Charter legitimates the 
international community’s involvement in Colombia.  
5.3.5  Peace Community -Is It Safe? 
For those who are not Convention Refugees and for different reasons have not 
crossed an international border, a “safety zone”, or in this case, a peace community may 
be the only option to survive. In Colombia, for a long time, the displaced basically hid to 
preserve their anonymity, but by the mid 1990s they began to seek safety in solidarity 
both at the local and national levels. Today, there are 60 to 70 organisations of displaced 
persons in Colombia (Cohen and Sanchez-Garzoli 2001). As an alternative to crossing 
an international border and seeking asylum, the best known organised self-protection 
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movements in Colombia are the “Peace Communities” (Communidades de Paz) and 
“Communities in Resistance” (Communidades en Resistencia) in Urabá. These emerged 
after intense fighting between government forces and FARC in 1997 and led to the first 
massive displacement and subsequent threats and massacres by paramilitary groups. The 
initial objective of the movement was to keep the civilian population out of the armed 
conflict by declaring civilian autonomy vis-à-vis armed groups (Lægreid 2001).  
A peace community is a unilateral commitment based on human rights and 
humanitarian law. Ideally, it is an agreement between all the actors involved in a conflict. 
It is a consolidation of humanitarian space. The question is whether these peace 
communities are and can remain peaceful in an environment that says “either you are 
with us, or you are against us”. Although the armed groups have agreed not to attack, 
peace communities in Colombia have been everything but safe, at worst they have been 
killing fields for the armed actors. 
In March 1997, seventeen of the 32 communities which make up San José de 
Apartadó declared themselves as a peace community, with the support of the Catholic 
Church and a number of Colombian non-governmental human rights organisations. 
This was an attempt to persuade the warring factions on both sides to respect their right 
to life and neutrality in the conflict. The considerable media coverage of the Pavarando 
camp, where IDPs languished in impoverished conditions for up to two years, served to 
raise awareness of the phenomenon of internal displacement in Colombia. It also laid 
bare the inadequate response on the part of the authorities to addressing the 
phenomenon of mass displacement. The members of the peace community have, 
however, continued to face intimidation, torture and death in the hands of FARC, the 
army and the paramilitaries. As for instance in 2001, army-backed paramilitaries entered 
the hamlet of La Unión and forcibly rounded up members of the peace community of 
San José de Apartadó. At the site of a previous massacre, in the centre of the hamlet, 
they threatened to kill the villagers that refused to collaborate with them, if they did not 
leave the area. Members of the paramilitary who have entered the peace community have 
also been recognised as members of the security forces (PBI 2001). Even if organised in 
peace communities, IDP leaders face increasing risks. A crucial element of such 
communities is their proclaimed neutrality. As with the indigenous people, this posture 
unfortunately has the reverse effect of making such communities, and in particular their 
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leaders, suspect in the eyes of all armed actors. Numerous murders and disappearances 
of IDP leaders have taken place (UNHCR 2002b).  
It is a paradox when members of the peace communities deny the state army 
entrance. This is because it is common knowledge that the state army provides the 
paramilitary with weapons. But are the civilians allowed to deny the army access, or is it 
possible to justify the intrusion of a state army into a peace community? Can the military 
force themselves into these communities? Legally yes, but politically not as long as they 
represent one part of the internal armed conflict (Kvernmo 2001 [Personal Interview]). 
Nevertheless, this strategy of creating “peace communities” remains one which 
should be given further consideration in the future as a possible mechanism for 
facilitating the dialogue between the Colombian government and the insurgent groups 
(Roldán 2001). For third parties in the conflict, those who neither are able nor want to 
leave their country, but are still forced to flee, the establishment of a neutral peace 
community may be the only secure option for survival and opportunity to gain access to 
basic facilities, such as food, shelter and medicines.  
In 1995, Chimni (2000a:443) emphasised the appropriateness and feasibility of 
creating a safety zone, which depends upon a number of factors. These include: who has 
the authority to create a safety zone, the length of time for which it is established, who 
are the parties which will guarantee its safe character, which category of people are to be 
protected, what are their rights in this zone, which agencies will be involved in the relief 
and assistance effort, and finally which of the stated purposes represents the 
predominant motive for creating the safety zone. Most importantly, however, a peace 
community must warrant respect from all armed actors when claiming to be neutral. The 
only actor who can ensure this may be the presence of international monitors (Sanchez 
2001 [Personal Interview]). 
5.3.6 UNHCR: In-Country Protection in Colombia 
Although it had been given neither mandate nor legal authority to protect IDPs, the 
increasing demand for in-country protection led the UNHCR to open an office in 
Colombia in June 1998. This was after an invitation from the Colombian Government in 
1997. The objectives of the programme there are twofold and directed towards the 
IDPs. Firstly, it aimed to support an effective, integrated and co-ordinated state and civil 
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society response in favour of the IDPs, based on fundamental protection principles and 
with special emphasis on the national institutional framework, and secondly, to 
contribute to the initiatives of the peace process by reinforcing the response to 
humanitarian concerns linked to internal displacement. In addition to carrying out its 
own operational plan, UNHCR plays an important role in facilitating interaction among 
agencies of the United Nations system on the issue of internal displacement, having been 
asked to do so on an informal basis by the United Nations Resident Co-ordinator in the 
country (E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.1). The UNHCR office in Bogotá works to strengthen 
the Government’s capacity to address the IDP problem and to work on regional refugee 
issues (US DOS 2001). UNHCR provides the Colombian government with technical 
advice, and helps the government maintain the registration system for the displaced. As 
problems of internal displacement are not high up on the social and political agenda in 
Colombia, UNHCR is working to increase the visibility of IDP issues in order to create a 
better understanding within receiving communities and the public at large (UNHCR 
2003c). UNHCR also operates four field offices that seek to ensure the “implementation of 
domestic legislation for displaced persons at the local level” and provide support to displaced 
persons’ organisations (USCR 2002). By doing this it makes the UNHCR political in 
their work. The question is if “to ensure” can be transferred to “make accountable”?17 
Even if its presence is accepted by the Colombian government, there are practical, 
political, and principled obstacles for in-country protection for the UNHCR. Most 
international presence is in the capital and not sufficiently spread out around the country 
and the international programmes undertaken target only a portion of the displaced 
population. But there are reasons why the international community has not established a 
more thorough presence in Colombia. One of the concerns is security, many prominent 
human rights monitors work under constant fear for their physical safety. Given their 
perceived or imputed “leftist” tendencies, many human rights organisations are 
stereotyped as being associated with the guerrillas and are subsequently targeted. 
Whenever feasible, UNHCR and partner organisations have accompanied IDP 
communities on the move. However, the intensified conflict has reduced the availability 
                                              
17 Other international agencies working on behalf of the IDPs are; the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN 
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme 
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of alternative locations and safe areas, leaving more and more affected groups in 
precarious situations. In order to maintain its field presence, UNHCR is continually 
monitoring security measures for its staff and NGO partners (UNHCR 2003c). 
Moreover, in general these organisations advocate a negotiated peace and end to 
Colombia’s internal conflict. In the current political climate, in which a negotiated peace 
is being eschewed in favour of a military response, the position of human rights activist 
is becoming more vulnerable with regard to paramilitaries who are increasing both their 
influence and popular support (UNHCR 2002b) 
Another consequence is that some IDPs are seeking safety in anonymity and 
consequently there is a problem of access. The humanitarian space is too small, and it 
stops access to the civil population. New areas are under control of illegally armed actors 
and the space believed to be secure is becoming smaller. Lack of access to IDPs makes 
this group more vulnerable than other exposed groups of people. Another reason for the 
limited presence is the Government’s readiness to transfer the responsibility for IDPs 
onto international organisations. Indeed, a number of authorities, at different levels, 
when asked on what needed to be done often deflected the onus for action onto the 
international community. It is vital that Colombia -a country with a high level of human 
and resource capacity –does not transfer to the international community the 
responsibilities that it has the duty and ability to discharge (E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.1).  
5.4 IDP Legislation –Lack of Implementation 
5.4.1 
                                                                                                                                           
 National Legal Framework 
Just as Colombia is one of the countries with the highest number of displaced 
persons, it is also the country with the most comprehensive and judicially advanced IDP 
legislation. It is very characteristic of Colombia that “if you can’t change the people, 
change the law”. For every new problem, a new law is established by the Colombian 
state. In 1995, under pressure from the church and national and international NGOs, the 
government acknowledged the magnitude of the displacement problem and elaborated a 
policy to prevent displacement and offer assistance to those already displaced (Delgado 
(WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA) 
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and Lægreid 2001:207).  A legal framework made up of laws, presidential decrees, 
government policy documents and court decisions regulates the prevention, protection, 
assistance and return/resettlement of the displaced persons. This framework also sets up 
co-ordinating structures and defines concrete responsibilities of each government 
institution (Global IDP Project 2001a).  
The centrepiece of this legal framework is IDP Law 387 from 1997. Law 387 
recognises displaced persons’ right to humanitarian aid in emergencies. It also provides 
direct access to the state’s social programmes with the aim of improving economic and 
social conditions to encourage return and resettlement. The law gives displaced persons 
access to government income-generating projects, the national agro-reform and rural 
development system, small business promotion, training and social organisation, 
programmes related to health and rural and urban housing, special programmes for 
children, women and the elderly, and urban and rural employment programmes 
organised by the RSS (Delgado and Lægreid 2001:207). Also, in May 2000 legislation 
classified forced displacement as a crime (US DOS 2001).  
Decree 2569 of December 2000 states that the Government, in co-operation with 
ICRC, will provide humanitarian assistance to displaced persons during the first 90 days 
of their displacement. Certain categories of persons may apply for an extension for a 
further three-month period, but the assistance is said to be far from satisfactory and in 
need of review (E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3). Though the exact moment when 
displacement ceases is not defined by the Guiding Principles, Decree 2569 attempts to 
define when displacement ends. The criteria are somewhat subjective and open to 
interpretations: 1. Successful return or resettlement, 2. Exclusion from the central 
government IDP registry, or 3. Upon request by the displaced person. But returning 
IDPs should also be in a position to receive economic and social restitution. However, it 
is argued that the social and emotional impact of displacement never ceases to affect 
those who are once displaced (Global IDP Project 2001a). 
The RSS has shown a desire to assist the displaced, particularly through their 
presence and the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, their response has 
been limited, owing to the scarcity of resources and the cumbersome nature of the relief 
                                                                                                                                           
and the International Organization of Migration (IOM) (E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.1). 
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mechanism. Despite the mandate entrusted to them by the Law 387, which provided for 
the establishment of departmental and municipal committees, municipalities and 
departments have played a very limited role in providing assistance to displaced persons 
(TGD 2001).  
According to the comprehensive legal policy framework, displaced persons in 
Colombia should theoretically enjoy advanced legal protection. Unfortunately, those 
rights are not being upheld and important parts of the legislation remain to be 
implemented. The very right not to be displaced was reportedly violated in every 
municipality represented. Initially, the legal framework generated enormous expectations 
among the displaced population, but those expectations, however, exceeded the state’s 
capacity to meet them. Indeed, according to Posada et. al. in Delgado and Lægreid 
(2001:207), recent studies suggest that the government’s offer to assist the displaced is 
more theoretical than real, and still very much in the developing stage. This gap is in 
large part due to the disparity between the resources available and the immense numbers 
of persons affected (UNHCR 2002b). The authorities acknowledge difficulties with 
inter-institutional management and co-ordination, information, and funding. Also the 
lack of specificity on how to implement government policy is one of the main 
constraints they face (E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.1).  
5.4.2 The Guiding Principles in Colombia –Are They Useful? 
Some countries have criticized the Guiding Principles for not having been approved 
in an intergovernmental review process and for supporting relief activities seen as 
humanitarian intervention violating national sovereignty (Global IDP Project 2002c). On 
his 1999 visit to Colombia, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally 
Displaced Persons, Francis Deng found that government officials accepted the UN 
Guiding Principles as a basis for dialogue. Indeed, a number of officials prepared 
advance analysis of displacement in Colombia on the basis of the Principles. Colombia’s 
Ambassador to the UN told the Economic and Social Council in July 2000 that the 
Colombian Government has “found these principles to be a useful guide” for its work. And the 
Office of the Defensoria del Pueblo included the Principles in its public awareness campaign 
on internal displacement while the RSS included the Principles in its compendium, 
Attention to the Population Displaced by the Armed Conflict. Colombia’s Constitutional 
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Court also cited the Principles in a recent decision, arguing that they “should be used as 
parameters for the creation of rules and for the interpretation of laws regarding forced displacement” 
(Cohen and Sanchez-Garzoli 2001). National NGOs have also widely disseminated the 
Guiding Principles, employed them as a benchmark against which to monitor and 
evaluate national policies and legislation, and used them to promote and strengthen 
dialogue with the Government on the rights of IDPs (Bagshaw 2001). Still, regrettably, 
as the Defensor del Pueblo noted, many of the Principles are not being observed. Violations 
of international human rights and humanitarian law continue to be systematic and 
widespread, and indeed appear to have only intensified in scope and severity 
(E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.1). 
5.4.3 Why an IDP Legislation is Necessary 
The lack of an IDP Convention has meant that the IDPs have not been recognised 
as persons entitled to assistance and protection from the international community. Lack 
of documentation has become an acute problem for displaced people in Colombia. To 
receive emergency help from the government, ‘certification’ is necessary, and the 
displaced must present personal identity documents. Some displaced Colombians have 
lost their documents in the chaos of fleeing their homes while others have had their 
documents stolen or destroyed. Some are lone women whose husbands -the traditional 
bearers of the family documents -are missing or have been killed. Some of the displaced 
people, however, have never had documentation even before the violence forced them 
from their homes. As expressed by an UNHCR employee, “the importance of documents has 
only really become an issue for them since becoming displaced. Being displaced, they need the documents to 
get government help and services” (UNHCR 2002c).  
It should be mentioned that the right to recognition as a person before the law is a 
universally recognised principle of international law. In this respect, the Guiding 
Principles also stress the need to carry out an effective documentation process for all 
displaced persons. Also, according to the Guiding Principles, the authorities must issue 
documents to IDPs, whether passports, personal identification documents, birth 
certificates or marriage certificates, so that they can enjoy their right to recognition 
before the law (Cohen and Sanchez-Garzoli 2001). However, the government is 
criticised for excessive bureaucracy and slow action, and most displaced persons are 
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either unaware of the assistance to which they are entitled or choose not to register. So 
frightened are many of the displaced that they try to remain invisible (Thompson 2002).  
Colombian legislation makes a distinction between someone who is in a “situation” 
of displacement and a person who has achieved the “status” of being formally 
recognised as displaced. This distinction, which is challenged by the Constitutional 
Court, the Ombudsman’s Office and many Colombian NGOs, gives the government the 
power to decide when a person’s “status” of being displaced ends (Global IDP Project 
2001a). But it is important that, through its concept of “assumption of good faith”, the 
Colombian Constitution puts the burden of proof on the authorities, rather than on the 
IDP, as it is today, when it comes to determine who is a displaced person and who is 
not. Such an interpretation would avoid situations where IDPs have to return to their 
areas of origin to collect “proof” of the events that caused their displacement (Ibid.). 
The displaced need to be brought out of the shadow, and have their needs recognised. 
This meaning legalisation of the communities in which the displaced live in, recognition 
of their ownership of the land on which they live and the acceptance by federal and local 
governments of their obligation to provide health, education, and public services to 
these communities (Thompson 2002).  
But there have been some improvements regarding registration, and IDPs have 
increasingly an opportunity to reclaim their identity. Under an agreement between the 
UNHCR and the Colombian Registrar, displaced people can now complete the whole 
application process in an UNHCR mobile unit, without having to leave their settlement. 
The information is sent in to the Colombian Registrar, and the Registrar gives priority 
processing to the applications from the displaced people and provides them with the 
actual documentation (cedula). The project enables displaced people to obtain a cedula in 
just two months, compared to the usual six to eight months. But the practical benefits of 
having a cedula are only part of the picture. Some displaced people tell of the very clear 
security risks they run without proper IDs. The armed groups demand a cedula (UNHCR 
2002c). Without an ID you are not recognised as a citizen and displaced people are eager 
to reclaim their identities, their documents and their rights. 
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5.4.4 The Collaborative Approach -Lack of Coordination and Resources 
Who can ensure protection to the IDPs and be in charge of implementing 
international law and responsibility? As written earlier, no single international agency has 
been assigned absolute responsibility or has sufficient capacity to attend to the varied 
requirements of IDPs. According to UNHCR, the most frequently engaged inter-agency 
approach is the collaborative approach wherein a single organisation is responsible for 
co-ordinating the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts of which IDPs are a part 
(Muggah 2000:148). In Colombia, UNHCR is the designated co-ordinator on 
displacement issues for the UN system. This task is carried out with the support of 
OCHA. In co-ordination with other UN agencies in the country, the UNHCR works to 
enhance mechanisms for facilitating inter-agency co-ordination on IDP issues (UNHCR 
2003c). It seems that the collaborative approach will continue trying to bridge the 
protection gap in Colombia. 
However, also in Colombia the collaborative approach is characterised by a 
complete lack of communication and co-ordination among and between public entities, 
the UN and the NGOs. This may be a result of the complex situation or lack of clear 
guidelines on who is doing what. In theory, the national capacity of the state (for 
instance the RSS) to respond is high, while local capabilities are relatively weak. As a 
result, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and NGOs have emerged to fill the gap. 
In regions that are particularly affected by conflict, non-state actors have become 
intermediaries between the state and civil society, in some cases taking on a status 
comparable to that of political parties. But as a result of their rapid increase in number 
and frequently narrow perspective, their activities have often resulted in contradictory 
impacts, leading to confusion between public entities and NGOs (Muggah 2000:148). In 
spite of this, Colombian NGOs, the Catholic Church and other religious-based 
organisations have been crucial in mobilizing a response to the needs of the displaced. 
It is generally accepted by all actors that local networks and community-based 
solidarity groups achieve the greatest impact for the least investment. It is similarly 
recognised that the state has little capacity to directly reproduce this phenomenon due to 
structural and financial constraints. Where relations between government and NGOs 
have been poor, lack of co-ordination has led to parallel rather than complementary 
NGO service provision. But that overlapping delivery could be reduced through the 
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articulation of clear lines of command and measures to increase accountability between 
NGOs and the state. In addition, NGOs must put pressure on municipalities and public 
entities to comply with their agreements and legal obligations to displaced people. At the 
same time, however, the research process revealed paternalistic attitudes towards IDPs 
among a number of local solidarity and human rights groups, whose representatives 
often spoke of “my communities” and “our IDP representatives”. Such sentiments often 
lead to IDP’s reluctance to collaborate with state actors on account of the perceived 
risks presented to their existing institutional and social investments (Ibid:148-149). 
A democratic state can endure only with a strong civil society, and it is the 
responsibility of the Colombian state to protect, promote and strengthen its civil society 
(E/CN.4/2002/106/Add.2). But there is not only the co-operation between the 
Government and the NGOs that have been criticised. At a NGO meeting in Bogotá 
(Global IDP Project 2001b), many national NGOs expressed frustrations that very little 
of the last years’ debate on institutional arrangements by the state and the UN on IDP 
issues had been shared with key NGO counterparts in the field. Colombian NGOs felt 
excluded from being up-dated on the latest institutional developments, widely discussed 
in Geneva and New York but seldom known and discussed in the field. Evaluating 
experiences with the UN system, Colombian NGOs came up with several critical points; 
there is currently no co-ordinating mechanism between the NGOs and the UN system 
as a whole. In the work of the UN Thematic Working Group on Internal Displacement 
(TGD), which objective is to contribute to ensure a more effective response by UN 
agencies towards displacement, includes the government but not the NGOs. The UN 
should promote a space for NGOs to discuss the government’s IDP policy and activities 
with appropriate Colombian government institutions. The UN in Colombia is said to 
have fallen into a Colombian cultural pattern with the development of elaborate 
theoretical schemes and programmes, while very little is actually achieved on the ground. 
The UN was seen as having a very limited scope in Colombia, both in terms of human 
and financial resources, and many NGOs requested a stronger political role for the UN. 
Several participants at the NGO meeting felt the UN should play a more active role in 
advocacy and take stronger political stand in favour of IDPs and other beneficiaries 
(Ibid.). Although, intended to be non-political, its work clearly takes place in a political 
context, which influences UNHCR’s personality and practice. In 2003 UNHCR intends 
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to advise the new government to integrate its forthcoming Action Plan on Internal 
Displacement into a four–year development plan. In addition, UNHCR will call for the 
Action Plan to be issued in the form of a law, in order to make it mandatory for the 
different entities of the National System for Integral Attention to the Displaced 
Population (UNHCR 2003c).  
In 2002, the UN agencies in Colombia completed a Humanitarian Plan of Action 
(HAP), which set out the priorities for co-ordinated UN intervention on behalf of the 
IDPs. The HAP was worked out in consultation with the NGO partners and the Red 
Cross Committee. It focuses on five main issues: co-ordination and capacity-building; 
protection and prevention; integration and reconstruction; health, education and social 
welfare; and food security (Ibid.). Most likely the collaborative approach will continue to 
bridge the protection gap in Colombia. However, it clearly needs to be strengthened 
especially on the level of coordination, including consistency in who is doing what, as 
well as increase of resources. 
5.5  Conclusion 
My aim with this empirical chapter was to illustrate how issues of internal 
displacement have an effect on both the principle of sovereignty and the work of the 
UNHCR. In the case of Colombia, the government’s lack of political will and capacity to 
provide protection maintains the protection gap. Colombia illustrates the dilemma 
between state sovereignty and international responsibility. Although Colombia has 
accepted international involvement and they have the most well developed national legal 
framework to protect and assist the IDPs, state responsibility when it comes to 
cooperation, coordination and implementation is absent. There is a large gap between 
norms and actual implementation. The degeneration of the conflict, combined with the 
lack of a comprehensive prevention strategy, has resulted in millions of IDPs living in a 
political vacuum between state sovereignty and international responsibility. 
The Colombian government does not meet its obligations under Law 387. With 
over two millions IDPs, and over 300,000 new ones each year, the phenomenon of 
internal displacement is taking on crisis proportions. There is clearly a need for an 
extended state presence. However, in comparison to other countries affected by internal 
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displacement there are a much larger number of state agencies and institutions in 
Colombia. Still, Colombia is a state out of order, an incomplete state behaving 
irresponsibly. A large part of its territory is not under the administrative control of the 
state, and the fundamental principle that the modern state should have a legitimate 
monopoly on the use of force bears no truth. Colombia’s population is caught in the 
middle between the state armed forces, paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces, used, 
mostly abused, by all combatants to meet their own ends. IDPs are like trapped birds 
whose fate absolutely depends on the wishes of the violators. This is a manifestation of 
the protection gap. Living in this protection gap, IDPs continue to suffer hardship and 
unsanitary living conditions with limited access to basic necessities. As long as the three 
actors invariably manage to accumulate economic and political resources that outweigh 
the costs of war, the protection gap will continue to exist. Because of the inefficiency of 
the judicial system, the individuals take the law into their own hands. Private security 
groups have expanded, the peace process is closed down and people continue to flee. 
“Sovereignty as responsibility” is absent and the sovereign state’s failure to protect its 
citizens draws the attention of the international community.  
Colombia has recognised the need for international involvement, which has 
resulted in an increase in the number of international agencies in the country. The new 
trend of cross border flight has had important implications for the international 
response, and the involvement of UNHCR. There are problems of protection and non-
respect for the doctrine and the international practice in the matter of refuge. The 
refoulement of fleeing Colombians is adding to the numbers of those internally 
displaced. This has lead to an increasing demand for in-country protection. However, it 
is important to maintain the balance between providing international protection without 
diluting the notion of state responsibility. It should be borne in mind that displacement 
and indeed the conflict generating it are symptoms of deeply rooted national problems. 
The tendency to render the international community responsible for addressing their 
needs may therefore be of serious concern. 
Lack of safe areas affects the IDPs and widens the protection gap because it 
reduces access to assist and protect the IDPs. This has created a need for a safe 
humanitarian space, which has resulted in the creation of peace communities. 
Unfortunately, IDPs in peace communities have continued to face intimidation, torture 
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and death from all the actors. International presence may improve the safety, but is it 
realistic to expect international presence in areas where the state itself is not present?18 
Even with the most comprehensive and judicially advanced IDP legislation, the 
response towards IDPs has been limited. But an IDP legislation is important to bring the 
displaced out of the shadow and have their needs recognised. The challenge of 
protecting IDPs in such a complicated context is great, and there is no quick or easy 
solution to the problem. UNHCR is the designated co-ordinator on displacement issues 
in Colombia. However, the collaborative approach is characterised by a complete lack of 
communication and co-ordination between the UN, the state and the NGOs. Herein lies 
a pressure on the UNHCR, as well as on the state which must prove political will to 
cooperate. This lack of taking responsibility by the state has resulted in political and 
security threats to the whole region. As a result, the protection gap has challenged the 
UNHCR in Colombia to move towards protection programs where IDPs are the main 
objective, including direct contact with the Colombian state to improve the state and 
civil society response to internal displacement.  
It is important to build upon the normative and institutional frameworks that 
have already been created and work closely with the international community, national 
and international NGOs and the leaders of the displaced to address the existing 
protection gap. As such, in the absent of a legal international agency, a collaborative 
approach deserves support. In the case of Colombia, the only solution to the problems 
of displacement, violence and conflict are long-term. It will probably take decades before 
the Colombian government is capable of fostering respect for human rights, the rule of 
law, and political and economic justice and equity for all Colombian citizens.  
Whether IDPs challenge the traditional notion of sovereignty in Colombia can be 
questioned. I will argue that legally, the state of Colombia is a responsible sovereign 
state, doing everything “right” in lines with normative developments. They have the 
most comprehensive and judicially advanced IDP legislation in the world. However, 
politically, the Colombian state’s sovereignty is questionable when implementation of 
IDP law is absent. The theory and practice do not coincide. When the state of Colombia 
                                              
18 Though the Democratic Republic of Congo is an example where this is the case. 
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in practice ignores its responsibility towards IDPs, it challenges the principle of 
sovereignty.   
How is it possible to hold a sovereign state accountable when political action is 
missing? There have been normative developments and an increased pressure on states, 
which have affected both the principle of sovereignty and the work of the UNHCR. Still, 
internal conflicts continue and forced displacement shows no sign of slowing down. 
Foreign involvement will make a difference, but it has to come in an adequate form. It 
has to balance both state responsibility and international responsibility. For this, 
universal legal international principles for how to deal with this new situation may help 
improve the protection of IDPs.  
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6. Conclusion 
The subject of internal displacement has presented the international community 
with new issues to deal with, and it has contributed to put pressure on state sovereignty 
and the work of the UNHCR. IDPs are a human rights issue and it has been a gradual 
acceptance by the international community that gross violations of human rights should 
take precedence over the traditional emphasis on state sovereignty. Abusive exercising of 
state power is becoming harder to hide and easier to condemn. This may be a result of a 
strong association with the belief that there is a direct relationship between international 
order and domestic order. This calls for an involvement of the international community 
to supplement the efforts of local and national authorities. In practice this has influenced 
the work carried out by the UNHCR, with an increase of in-country protection as a 
result. There is, however, need for a more comprehensive, reliable and predictable 
international system of response to the IDPs. Although, the principle of sovereignty is 
the main political impediment when dealing with the protection of IDPs, the Westphalia 
system of government is here to stay and governments will always be reluctant to 
constrain one another’s latitude. The subject of internal displacement and the protection 
gap clearly challenge the principle of sovereignty and the work of the UNHCR. 
Through an empirical analysis, I have attempted to describe the kind of problems 
the subject of internal displacement presents to the international community, as well as 
the kind of obstacles that impede the international community from providing 
protection to the IDPs. The reason for choosing to analyze the principle of sovereignty 
and UNHCR is that they both have been affected by the two main causes for increased 
internal displacement: internal conflicts and restrictive asylum policy. Also, when 
explaining the protection gap, state sovereignty constitutes a political barrier to the 
UNHCR where non-interference is the basis for their mandate.  
 I found it necessary to include a chapter based on the international legal 
framework, the reason being that the protection gap appeared as a result of lack of an 
international legal framework and an institution responsible for protecting the IDPs 
when the state neither has political will nor capacity to do it itself. There are no legal 
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guidelines for how to deal with this immense and growing group of people in need for 
assistance and protection. I also found it necessary to evaluate whether the proposals put 
forward to deal with this hole in international law are adequate in protecting the people 
uprooted within their own country. I included Colombia as an empirical manifestation of 
reality. Colombia is a state which carries out its responsibility legally but not in practice 
and by ignoring human rights millions of persons are internally displaced. Colombia is 
also an example of a country with an internal conflict which is met with restrictive 
asylum policy from its neighbor countries, jeopardizing regional and international 
security. It is not necessarily a conflict between the tradition of sovereignty and the 
international community’s right to get involved. This only becomes a problem when a 
state does not respect human rights and at the same time does not allow international 
intervention. The case of Colombia is something in between. Through a national legal 
framework, human rights and IDPs’ need for protection are respected. But this is not 
implemented in practice, which creates a dilemma between state sovereignty and 
international responsibility. Abandoned by their national authorities, IDPs’ only source 
of protection and assistance becomes the international community, UNHCR being one 
of the actors. 
 The protection gap has had both political, principle and practical implications for 
the work of UNHCR. UNHCR has had mixed reactions to the global changes. In 
stylized terms, pragmatists favor an expanded definition of UNHCR’s target group and 
mandate and want to help the internally displaced based upon their circumstances and 
not their locations, and fundamentalists fear that an expanded definition would make it 
easier for states to avoid their obligations under refugee law and would dilute UNHCR’s 
core mission, refugees. The debate on developments of the IDP category and its 
implications for UNHCR highlight that such developments precipitate reconsiderations 
of the meaning of sovereignty and raise potentially troubling concerns for traditional 
rights. However, it is a conflict of interest, both politically and practically. UNHCR 
needs to make a priority, and so far refugees have been their priority. In-country 
protection is not out of bound for the UNHCR. Although UNHCR has only limited 
capacity to influence outcomes or to ensure that states abide to their obligations, it has 
autonomy from its role as protector of refugee law and individuals who fall between the 
protections of national states.  
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 The world is changing and the international community needs to adjust to keep 
up with the international agenda. New issues appear with which it is necessary to deal 
urgently take precedence on the international agenda, IDPs being one of them. The 
refugees are becoming fewer, and the number of IDPs growing, this having an effect on 
the ways of helping people in need. UNHCR is a potential provider of protection and 
assistance, but already occupied with refugees, they need both new authoritative 
guidelines and an increase of resources, or alternatively, as is the case today, they must be 
complemented by other international agencies. 
 How can the international community intercede to overcome the obstacles 
created by the protection gap in international law? Although, there have been UN efforts 
to improve capacity and response to internal displacement, there are serious gaps in the 
UN response. It does not seem likely that an existing institution will be mandated to 
assume full responsibility for the internally displaced. While no single agency wants 
responsibility for IDPs, no agency wants any other to get it either. As a result of this, the 
collaborative approach has evolved. Whether this is a result of the unwillingness or 
inability of governments to address the needs of the displaced, or that governments and 
UN agencies really believe in collaboration, using comparative advantages, the 
consequence has nevertheless always been an inadequate response.  With no one to co-
ordinate who is doing what, or at least ensure that action is taken, the protection gap will 
continue to exist. But if the UN does not strive to bridge the protection gap, we can also 
talk about negative UN responsibility. An important balance is to not dilute state 
responsibility but rather ensure accountability.  
 The Guiding Principles identify the protection gap. States, however, will always 
be very reluctant to sign a law which may affect their state sovereignty, and the process 
towards making the Guiding Principles binding will most likely be long and complex. In 
the mean-time, the Guiding Principles may help increase the focus on the subject of 
internal displacement and gain the attention from the international community, in an 
effort to improve the protection of IDPs.  
 A specific agency in the field is given the task of serving as the locus of 
responsibility for IDPs, the IDP Unit in OCHA. Complementary and mutually 
supportive, the IDP Unit, in cooperation with the Brookings Institution-SAIS Project on 
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Internal Displacement19 has embarked on a Protection Survey which will examine the 
protection response of country teams to internal displacement. In the beginning of May 
2003 major findings and recommendations will be presented. The final purpose and 
overall aim of the exercise is to identify, in a systematic way, the presence of gaps in the 
collaborative approach both at the institutional and policy level as well as the sectorial 
level and provide recommendations to reduce the gaps (OCHA 2002a).  
 In addition, the role of NGOs and the media should not be underestimated. They 
too can channel international pressure on states, both morally and politically. It will be 
important to continue to bring NGOs (which do most of the real human rights fact-
finding) into the appointments process, thereby providing some guarantee that members 
are true experts in human rights, rather than experts in defending governments accused 
of violating them (Robertson 2000:47). 
 There may be no answer for how to make a state abide by international 
obligations. The international response system is largely ad hoc, and there is no 
willingness to promote new international instruments or agencies as long as it may 
influence sovereignty. National response to refugee flows has become more restrictive, 
and despite a gradual acceptance of human rights and international involvement, human 
rights continue to be subordinated to state sovereignty. The test, incidentally, is not 
whether a state has signed a treaty, but whether it has agreed to be bound by it through 
the process known as ratification. Enforcement will remain utopian until state parties are 
prepared to give the UN the power to condemn the conduct of its members, meaning 
themselves. Often there is a hidden agenda, and the nation with the most to offer the 
human rights movement in the twenty-first century will, it appears, do so only on the 
strict condition that other countries are the targets. This will be a major problem for the 
future. The next challenge for international law, having made individuals as well as 
governments its subjects, must be to encompass institutions which are neither states nor 
persons but increasingly more powerful than either. If the promises of the Universal 
Declaration are to be realized, there may be an idea to look to bodies independent of the 
UN, to regional treaty systems and their courts, to forge an international human rights 
                                              
19 The Brookings Institution is an independent, nonpartisan organization. The Brookings-SAIS Project on 
Internal Displacement was created to promote a more effective national, regional and international response to the 
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law sufficiently understood and respected to be enforced in municipal courts throughout 
the world (Ibid:xix and 441). 
The subject of internal displacement and the protection do challenge the principle 
of sovereignty and the mandate of the UNHCR. The international community remains 
fraught with dilemmas, ambivalence and tensions. Leading international experts, 
advocates and others concerned with IDPs sees government accountability and 
improved coordination of aid as key challenges in the international community’s effort 
to improve protection of IDPs.  
 The global changes may create new opportunities for state sovereignty. The 
increasing respect for human rights may result in states being more responsible and held 
accountable if they break them. The question is if these normative developments can be 
transferred to international law. What accountability is there to ensure sovereignty comes 
with responsibility? The enforcement of international human rights standards will most 
likely never be as normal as is, say, the enforcement of domestic criminal law. States 
exclude themselves from international jurisdiction for no better reason than that they 
choose not to be judged.  International law is a system created and controlled by 
sovereign states, for their own convenience. But there seems to be an increase awareness 
and agreement about the notion that state sovereignty should be perceived in terms of 
responsibility and the respect of their citizens. This is decisive to promote international 
peace and security. Nothing can act a sustainable substitute for state responsibility. 
 The chapter on international response has yet to be closed. The biggest gap in the 
response to IDPs is protection and there is clearly a need to continue to explore the area 
of internal displacement, particularly the impact of the concept of sovereignty as 
responsibility on states, inter-governmental agencies and NGOs. My aim with this thesis 
has been to answer which ways the subject of internal displacement and the protection 
gap challenges the principle of sovereignty and the mandate of the UNHCR, in addition 
to raising awareness of these uprooted people that constitute a national problem, but are 
requiring an international response.  
It is, however, a question of the international community’s political will to establish 
a new regime to mobilize action. In the future, it is to be hoped that the IDP issue 
                                                                                                                                           
IDP problem. The Project is co-directed by Dr. Francis M. Deng, Representative of the UN Secretary-General on 
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receives the attention which is needed within this new international refugee regime, and 
that this new regime can help improve the protection of millions of people fleeing from 
persecution, without being bound to whether the person fleeing has crossed an 
international border or not.  
                                                                                                                                           
Internally Displaced Persons. 
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